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RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES: THE NATURE AND 
ENFORCEABILITY OF RESIDENTIAL 
SEGREGATION BY AGE 
Mary Doyle* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past two decades, the retirement community has become 
an increasingly important element in the national housing picture, 
and demographic and sociological factors indicate that this trend will 
continue in the years ahead. The sunbelt states of Florida, Arizona, 
and California, which have been traditionally attractive to mobile re-
tirees and thus have been the setting for the first of the retirement 
communities, have seen a net increase in their older populations of 
well over one-half million persons between 1960 and 1970.1 Al-
though housing developments of this type were virtually unknown 
in California twenty years ago, by 1966 the state had thirty-five re-
tirement communities housing approximately 54,000 persons. 2 Ari-
zona's famous Sun City, located fifteen miles northwest of Phoenix, 
has grown from a population of 7,300 in 1965 to 40,000 today, with 
a population of more than 55,000 projected for 1980.8 Green 
Valley, near Tucson, is expected to grow from 6,000 to 30,000 per-
sons in the next decade. 4 The retirement-community concept has 
taken hold in other areas of the country as well, most notably in the 
metropolitan states of the northeast. In New Jersey, for example, 
there are 30,000 retirement community dwelling units, with an 
increase of 15,000 units anticipated in Ocean County alone.5 
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia; Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Arizona. B.A. 1965, Radcliffe College; LL.B. 1968, 
Columbia University.-Ed. 
1. K. HEINTZ, RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES 26 (1976). 
2. M. BARKER, CALIFORNIA RETIREMENT CoMMUNITIES ix (1966). 
3. Interview with Don Tuffs, Assistant Director, Public Relations, Del E. Webb 
Development Corporation, in Phoenix, Ariz., July 28, 1977. 
4. Arizona Daily Star, June 1, 1975, at 6A, col. 1. 
5. K. HEINTZ, supra note 1, at 16. 
Part of the explanation for the rise of the retirement community is demographic. 
Life expectancy in the United States has soared from 49 years at the tum of the 
century to 71.9 years in 1974, U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECfS OP 
AGING AND THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITllD STATES 25 (1976), and the per-
centage of the population over 60 years of age has more than doubled in that period, 
64 
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As used here, the term "retirement community" describes a 
planned, age-segregated residential development designed for active 
older adults, often with provision for recreational and other appro-
priate services. 6 Within the rather broad scope of this definition, 
retirement communities vary widely in appearance, affluence, organ-
ization, and atmosphere. Sun City, for example, is located in an out-
lying unincorporated area, with housing that consists entirely of de-
tached single-family dwellings designed for the relatively affluent 
retiree. Elaborate recreational facilities and opportunities are avail-
able, 7 reflecting the developer's plan to provide a way of life rather 
than just a place to live. In contrast to that design, but still within 
the definition of "retirement community," are smaller age-restricted 
developments Jocated within towns and cities that provide their 
residents fewer amenities and lower-cost housing. A moderately 
priced development might offer mobile-home living, 8 relatively high-
density housing, or a housing mix, and recreational facilities might 
be limited to a single swimming pool or clubhouse. 
Similar variety may be found in the means by which age segre-
gation is established and in the degree to which age exclusivity is 
maintained. Many retirement communities have developed only 
from 6.4% in 1900 to 14.8% in 1975, id. at 6. In absolute numbers, the over-60 
population is expected to climb from the present 31.6 million to 42 million by the 
year 2000, a one-third increase. Id. at 3. Although the Bureau of the Census labels 
as "unfounded" reports that within 50 years one-third of the population will be over 
65, id. at 10, its prediction is that the proportion of those over 65 will continue to 
increase over the next five decades. 
A second factor contributing to the growth of the pool of candidates for retire-
ment community living is the concomitant increase in the percentage of older persons 
who are retired. About 80% of men over 65 are retired today, a figure made more 
dramatic when compared with the 1950 retirement rate of only 50%. See id. at 49. 
Additionally, the age for retirement in the United States is steadily falling. Although 
age 65 traditionally has marked the career's end and the onset of retirement, census 
figures show a marked rise over the past 10 years in the percentage of retirees among 
men aged 55 to 64, id. at 50-51. The percentage of retired women in this group 
has remained essentially unchanged. Id. 
6. The use of the word "retirement" might be misleading. The type of residential 
development contemplated here is segregated by age but not by employment status, 
so persons of the requisite age are eligible for residence even though they still work. 
7. These include six large "recreation centers" containing auditoriums, swimming 
pools, arts and crafts rooms, club and meeting facilities, libraries, and large social 
halls. The centers provide an extensive social life for residents that is organized 
around a panoply of clubs and organizations. Among the more unlikely offerings 
are the Handbell Ringers Club, the Sun City Twirlers, and the Sun City Power 
Riders, the latter being a group of motorcycle enthusiasts. Other amenities include 
medical and shopping facilities, a boarding stable for horses, and nine 18-hole golf 
courses. 
8. For a description of a typical trailer park for retirees, see Hoyt, The Life of 
the Retired in a Trailer Park, 59 AM. J. Soc. 361 (1954). 
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after the adoption of a zoning ordinance limiting occupancy to 
persons over a certain age, typically fifty-two or fifty-five, with ex-
ceptions frequently provided for a younger spouse and one child be-
yond high-school age. 0 Other communities have achieved the same 
ends through reciprocal private covenants imposing residential age 
restrictions. Yet another method of effecting residential age segre-
gation operates without benefit of zoning ordinances or restrictive 
covenants, relying instead on restrictions that are informally estab-
lished and privately maintained. An example of this approach is 
Sun City, where residence by younger persons or families with chil-
dren is discouraged by exclusionary marketing policies and by such 
planned disincentives as an absence of parks and nearby schools. 
As retirement communities have become popular housing alter-
natives for elderly persons, they have also increasingly gained the 
attention of the couvts. More specifically, several state court cases 
have arisen in which age-restrictive zoning ordinances have been 
challenged on constitutional and statutory grounds. Although the 
earliest of those challenges were by and large successful, the most 
recent decisions have sustained age-restrictive zoning. Indicative of 
the trend is the fact that within the past several years two of the most 
respected state tribunals, the highest courts of New Jersey and New· 
York, have upheld zoning ordinances that provided for the creation 
of retirement communities.10 
There is cause, however, for questioning whether these most 
recent cases represent the final judicial verdict on the constitutional 
validity of age-restrictive zoning ordinances. First, no federal court 
has had occasion to review such an ordinance. Second, and perhaps 
more important, the significant state court decisions in this area were 
delivered before the Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. City of 
9. For example, the court in Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning 
Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 237 n.4, 364 A.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (1976), noted that 12 senior 
citizen communities in New Jersey had been developed pursuant to age-restrictive 
zoning ordinances. Such ordinances may also allow quite limited zoning adjust-
ments--most commonly relaxation of parking requirements--for senior citizen hous-
ing developments. Others go further by allowing significant density concessions for 
special age-restricted zones. · 
Although as a formal matter it is often the developer filing the rezoning ap-
plication who requires inclusion of a residential age restriction, the impetus for the 
age limitation generally comes from local government. The political realities are fre-
quently such that without a minimum age requirement, the density or other con-
cessions crucial to the economic feasibility of such projects would not be granted. 
This bargaining is particularly apt to occur in communities that have little or no 
high-density development and are fearful of the fiscal impact of this ratable were it 
to increase the cost of municipal services by permitting residence by school-age chil-
dren. 
10. See text at notes 20-26 & 63-90 infra. 
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East Cleveland, 11 where the Court found unconstitutional a zoning 
ordinance that restricted the manner in which members of the same 
family could live together. Although the zoning ordinance in Moore 
did not impose age restrictions on occupancy, the decision articu-
lates new limitations on state action that restricts the freedom of 
members of the same family· to live with one another. Since many 
retirement communities forbid otherwise eligible residents from liv-
ing in the community with younger members of their families, the 
decision in Moore suggests that the constitutionality of such age 
segregation and the means employed to enforce it must be compre-
hensively examined. . 
This Article offers a first contribution to that process of ex-
amination. Although age segregation in retirement communities 
can be established in a variety of ways, the Article focuses pri-
marily on age-restrictive zoning ordinances, the method most di-
rectly involving governmental action. The Article first considers 
those persons adversely affected by age-restrictive retirement com-
munities and suggests that potential plaintiffs may be divided into 
three classes-neighboring property owners whose land values are 
affected by the establishment of a retirement community, those 
excluded from such a community solely by virtue of ·their age, and 
those excluded or potentially excluded because of the age of persons 
with whom they choose to live. Next, the constitutional arguments 
available to each class of plaintiffs are explored. As a prcxluct 
of that analysis, the Article contends that age-restrictive zoning 
ordinances warrant strict judicial scrutiny, not because of their 
economic impact or because they establish age segregation per se, 
but rather because they intrude on the elderly individual's funda-
mental right to freedom of choice regarding family living arrange-
ments. In line with that conclusion, the Article then suggests 
that the justifications that a community might offer in support of 
age-restrictive zoning do not withstand such scrutjny. Next, the 
A1iticle considers possible arguments that the establishment of age 
segregation in retirement communities by means of restrictive cove-
nants involves state action and thus is subject to constitutional attack 
under the fourteenth amendment. Concluding that these arguments 
are highly unlikely to prevail, the Article suggests that the use of 
restrictive covenants by retirement communities is immune from 
constitutional attack. 
11. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
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JI. CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF AGE RESTRICTIONS 
IN ZoNING ORDINANCES 
Three different types of plaintiffs might challenge the constitu-
tional validity12 of age restrictions in zoning ordinances. First, resi-
dents and taxpayers who own property near an area designated by 
the ordinance as a retirement district might object ,to the zoning be-
cause their property values have been adversely affected.13 The 
second group of potential plaintiffs, who might be labeled "young 
excludees," are those that the ordinance bars from residing in the 
retirement district solely on the basis of their young age. Included 
in this group are young singles, young couples, and those families 
in which all the members are too young to be eligible for residence. 
The third group, which might be called "age-heterogeneous fami-
lies," share with the second the characteristic of being excluded 
under the terms of the ordinance's age restriction. Although one 
or more of such a family's members are old enough to qualify for 
occupancy, the family as a whole is nevertheless excluded because 
of the presence of a young child, or depending on the .terms of the 
ordinance, because one spouse is too young to be eligible for occu-
pancy. 14 Included in this group of excludees aie, for example, ,the 
55-year-old man who is married to a younger wife and senior citizens 
who-have assumed the care and custody of their grandchildren. 
12. The validity of age-restrictive zoning depends not only upon constitutional 
considerations but also upon the local government's authority under state zoning-en-
abling legislation. The cases in this area have dealt with both the statutory and con-
stitutional questions. The statutory issues raised have included whether the challenged 
zoning was adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan, see, e.g., Taxpayers 
Assn. v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 261-62, 364 A.2d 1016, 1022-23 (1976), 
whether the enabling act permits the regulation of land users, as opposed to land 
uses, see, e.g., 71 N.J. at 275-80, 364 A.2d at 1030-33, and whether the exclusion of 
young people violates the statutory mandate to zone for the "general welfare," see, 
e.g., 71 N.J. at 265-75, 364 A.2d at 1024-30, a claim that replicates the constitutional 
due process claim. Since questions of statutory interpretation vary in their particulars 
from state to state, they are only generally noted here. 
13. See, e.g., Campbell v. Barraud, 58 App. Div. 2d 570, 57•1, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909, 
911 (1977); Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 486, 330 N.E.2d 403, 406, 369 
N.Y.S.2d 385, 390, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975). 
14. See, e.g., the ordinance at issue in Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. 
& Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976); Taxpayers Assn. v. Weymouth 
Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 311 A.2d 187 (Super, Ct. App. Div. 1973), revd., 
71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976). The Woodland Township ordinance restricted 
residency "to persons who are 52 years of age or over except that one child who is 
19 years of age or over may be permitted to reside." 71 N.J. at 234, 364 A.2d at 
11008. Under this formulation, a 52-year-old with a younger spouse would be ineli-
gible to live in the restricted district. The Weymouth ordinance similarly limited 
residency to elderly persons (52 years of age or over) or elderly families (that could 
include, however, a younger spouse 45 years of age or over, and all their children 
over 18). 125 N.J. Super. at 379, 311 A.2d at 188. 
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Although the cases in this area do not distinguish between 
younger and older excludees, the distinction is offered here as a 
means of comprehensively ordering and addressing the constitutional 
issues raised by age-restrictive zoning ordinances. More particu-
larly, the category of older excludees is formulated to emphasize that 
age-restrictive zoning provisions can operate to exclude people not 
only on the basis of their age but also because of their family arrange-
ments. As will be shown later, this fact has constitutional signif-
icance.15 
A. Constitutional Claims of Neighbor-Taxpayers 
The first reported opinion involving the validity of an age-
restrictive zoning ordinance was a .1965 Connecticut case, Hinman 
v. Planning and Zoning Commission.10 In that case, the town had 
amended its zoning ordinance to create a retirement community dis-
trict where higher density residential development was permitted 
and occupancy was restricted to persons aged over fifty, with excep-
tions for younger spouses and children over eighteen years old. The 
court invalidated the ordinance on -the statutory ground that the 
minimum age restriction went beyond the delegated zoning powers 
of the town.17 In the next decade only a few cases, all from either 
New Jersey or New York,- involved challenges to a local govern-
ment's decision to grant permission-either by zoning or special 
permit-for development of an age-restricted commu_nity.18 With 
one exception, these early cases, like Hinman, invalidated the age-
restrictive zoning.19 
15. See text at notes 98 .. 126 infra. 
16. 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (C.P. 1965). 
17. The Hinman court suggested that the welfare of the developer who initiated 
the zoning amendment, rather than the town's welfare, was the object of the amend-
ment, since the town had no demonstrated need for a retirement community. 26 
Conn. Supp. at 129, 214 A.2d at 133. For an account of how the Town of South-
bury neatly avoided the court's decision in Hinman and arranged for construction of 
the retirement community, see 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 
50.16, at 301 n.111 (1974). 
18. Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 128 N.J. Super. 379, 
320 A.2d 191 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), affd. on other grounds, 135 N.J. Super. 
97, 342 A.2d 853 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975 ), revd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 
(1976); Taxpayers Assn."v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 311 A.2d 187 
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973}, revd., 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976); Molino v. 
Mayor & Council of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 2811 A.2d 401 (Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1971); Maldini v. Ambro, 43 App. Div. 2d ti64, 349 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1973), 
affd., 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 
993 (1975). Cf. Central Management Co. v. Town Bd., 47 Misc. 2d 385, 262 
N.Y.S.2d 728 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (vacating town board decision finding location of pro-
posed development unsuited for senior citizens). 
19. The exception was Maldini v. Ambro, 43 App. Di'{. 2d 664, 349 N,Y.S.2d 
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Beginning in 1975, however, the authority of these cases was 
diminished by the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in 
Maldini v. Ambro,20 which sustained a retirement community zoning 
orcl4iance. In 1976 the New Jersey Supreme Court followed, up-
holding zoning age restrictions by reversing the lower court decisions 
in the companion cases of Taxpayers Association of Weymouth v. 
Weymouth Township21 and Shepard v. Woodland Township Com-
mittee and Planning Board.22 Most recently, the New York Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division, reversed the trial court and ruled 
in favor of an age-restrictive zoning ordinance in Campbell v. 
Barraud.28 
Interestingly, none of the age-restrictive zoning cases has re-
sulted from a direct confrontation between the local government and 
those excluded from residency in the age-restricted zone. Rather, 
in every case the zoning has been challenged by plaintiffs who were 
neighboring property owners and taxpayers in the community, not 
excludees. Their constitutional claim is that density concessions 
granted in the retirement community zone will result in increased 
traffic, congestion, and pollution and will lead to a decline in surround-
ing property values in violation of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 24 The plaintiffs in these cases, however, have 
not rested their challenge on this theory, apparently recognizing that 
the courts in zoning cases have generally been unpersuaded by the 
property-rights claims of neighbors.25 In Maldini, for example, the 
646 (1973), a/fd., 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dis-
missed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975), affirming the trial court's judgment sustaining the 
ordinance. 
20. 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed, 423 
U.S. 993 (1975). 
21. 71 NJ. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976). 
22. 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976). 
23. 58 App. Div. 2d 570, 394N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977). 
24. See cases cited in note 13 supra. Aesthetic objections may also play a part 
in motivating neighbors to sue, though this claim 4as nowhere been expressly stated, 
probably,because zoning to exclude older persons on aesthetic grounds has been held 
unreasonable and violative of the fourteenth amendment. In Women's Kansas City 
St. Andrew Socy. v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1932), the court stated: 
Certainly the fact that aged people may have a depressing effect on some 
people is not sufficient to exclude such people from a district. There is no limit 
to the causes that may depress people, but they do not furnish a basis for the 
support of a restriction as to use of one's property. 
58 F.2d at 603. See also Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 
U.S. 116 (1928). 
25. Professor Norman Williams has explained this phenomenon in zoning law as 
follows: 
Most of the ,serious legal work on the American land use control system has 
•.• operated on the assumption that the only important (or the really import• 
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New Yark Court of Appeals quickly rejected the plaintiffs' property 
claims on the ground that "a possible depreciation in value to par-
ticular property owners will not shield an existing zoning classifica-
tion from adaption to changing community needs."26 
The exclusionary aspects of age-restrictive zoning ordinances are 
more clearly vulnerable to constitutional attack, and consequently the 
neighbor-taxpayer plaintiffs have advanced constitutional claims not 
so much on their own behalf as on behalf of those excluded by the 
terms of the ordinance in question. These claims would likely not 
be heard in federal court because of the Supreme Court's strict in-
terpretation of standing requirements.27 In state courts, however, 
where all the age-restrictive zoning cases have been brought, the 
standing rules are generally much less stringent, and thus in most 
cases the neighbor-taxpayers have been able to assert the constitu-
tional claims of excludees without challenge.28 As a result, personal 
rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment-and not property claims-have formed the 
ant) type of law suits in this field are those brought by developers to challenge 
restrictions on their rights . . . . In neighbors' cases the legal technology is re-
latively primitive, with no clearly established nationwide rules on the appropriate 
doctrine to deal with such suits. In the major zoning states, the courts have 
shown a good deal of ingenuity in invoking various doctrines to give the neigh-
bors at least some standing to raise issues in court . . . • However, the only 
common denominator nationwide is that, except in a very few states, in fact the 
neighbors usually lose. 
1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 17, § 2.01, at 73-74. 
26. 36 N.Y.2d at 486, 330 N.E.2d at 406, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 390. 
21. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The following passage from the 
Court's opinion imposing restrictive standing requirements on plaintiffs in exclusion-
ary zoning suits seems relevant to the standing of neighbor-taxpayer plaintiffs in age-
restrictive zoning cases: 
In several cases, this Court has allowed standing to litigate the rights of third 
parties when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would 
result indirectly in the violation of third parties' rights . . . . But the taxpayer-
petitioners are not themselves subject to Penfield's zoning practices. Nor do 
they allege that the challenged zoning ordinance and practices preclude or other-
wise adversely affect a relationship existing between them and the persons whose 
rights assertedly are violated . . . . Nor do the taxpayer-petitioners show that 
their prosecution of the suit is necessary to insure protection of the rights as-
serted, as there is no indication that persons who in fact have been excluded 
from Penfield are disabled from asserting their own right in a proper case. In 
sum, we discern no justification for recognizing in the Rochester taxpayers a 
right of action on the asserted claim. 
422 U.S. at 510 (citations omitted). See also Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of 
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). 
28. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. at 235 
n.1, 364 A.2d at 1008 n.1; Taxpayers Assn. v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. at 263 
n.5, 364 A2d at 1023 n.5. In addition, consider Campbell v. Barraud, where the 
court labeled neighbor-plaintiffs' standing to challenge the age _restrictions "highly 
questionable," but decided to reach the merits of the issue because of the state's "lib-
eral policy of standing in zoning cases." 58 App. Div. 2d at 571, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 
911. 
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basis for the constitutional challenge to residential age restrictions 
in zoning. 
Although standing in its technical sense has not been an issue 
in the age-restrictive zoning cases, the absence of individual ex-
. cludees has in some instances presented a problem for the neighbor-
taxpayer plaintiffs. The neighbor-taxpayer plaintiffs object to 
higher density development out of concern for property values or 
aesthetics, 29 and thus the relief they seek is not a declaration of the 
invalidity of the minimum-age provisions in the ordinance, but pro-
hibition of the rezoning itself. These plaintiffs are in a poor position 
to assert an exclusionary zoning claim, since the result they seek-
precluding higher-density development in the challenged zone-is 
itself exclusionary. 
B. Constitutional Claims of Young Excludees8° 
1. Equal Protection 
To challenge the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance 
successfully, plaintiffs must overcome the courts' traditional re-
luctance to become involved, without explicit constitutional justifica-
tion, in complexities and choices that are basically legislative in 
nature. Under the two-tiered system developed by the Supreme 
Court for treating challenges to legislative classifications under the 
equal protection clause, most cases are decided according to stan-
dards of reasonableness that are less than exacting. 81 First, the 
29. That plaintiffs' exclusionary motive is likely to be recognized is illustrated by 
an observation of the New Jersey Supreme Court in .Weymouth: "In the present case, 
though, plaintiffs have not attacked the overall pattern of land use regulation adopted 
by Weymouth Township as improperly exclusionary. . . . Indeed, the trial testimony 
of several individual plaintiffs suggests that their true objection to the ordinances may 
be that they are not sufficiently exclusionary." 71 N.J. at 294, 364 A.2d at 1040-
41 •. 
30. To simplify the ensuing analysis, the claims of young excludees will be ad-
dressed as though the young persons were parties to the litigation and were asserting 
constitutional claims on their own behalf and seeking a nonexclusionary result limited 
to the removal of the age restriction from the ordinance. 
31. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. 
REv. 341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 
1065 (1969). 
Some commentators have observed that the courts in fact frequently abandon the 
two-tiered standard in favor of an unarticulated sliding scale approach, where the 
scope of judicial review is a function of the importance of the rights allegedly im-
paired. The .chief virtue of that standard is, of course, its comparative flexibility. 
See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. RBV. 
1 (1972). For an example of such treatment in the area of sex-based classifications, 
see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in which the Court struck down a legislative 
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state's purpose in creating the challenged classification must be 
legitimate. Then, the classification must be found to be reasonably re-
lated to that purpose, both in terms of the need for any classification 
at all and in terms of the relationship of the particular classification 
to the objective: "the classification must be reasonable, not ar-
bitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair 
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all 
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. "32 Classifica-
tions having a reasonable basis do not violate the fourteenth amend-
ment for lack of "mathematical nicety" or because they result in 
"some inequality."33 Furthermore, -"if any state of facts reasonably 
can be conceived that would sustain [the classification], the exis-
tence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must 
be assumed."34 Judged under this relaxed standard, most legislative 
acts will readily withstand attack. 
In certain circumstances, however, plaintiffs may be able to 
trigger significantly more rigorous judicial review. Under the two-
tiered approach, that strict review will be applied when the court 
finds that the classification is based upon a constitutionally "suspect" 
class, or that the classification denies to a class the exercise of a 
"fundamental right" protected by the Constitl,ltion, or that it denies 
a benefit to members of a class on the basis of their exercise of a 
fundamental right. 35 If plaintiffs are successful in demonstrating the 
presence of a fundamental right or suspect class, the court will apply 
"the most rigid scrutiny" to the legislation. 36 By way of justification, 
the state must then. demonstrate not just that the legislation furthers 
a legitimate state objective, but that it "promotes a compelling state 
classification that preferred men over equally qualified women in the appointment 
of administrators of decedents' estates. Sex has not been designated .a suspect classi-
fication, so that gender-based legislative categories are, in theory, not subjected to 
strict scrutiny. But, though the Court purported to use the minimal rational basis 
standard, the classification at issue in Reed did not survive constitutional challenge. 
As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 106 (1972), it appears that the Court in Reed, although 
not expressly deviating from the two-tiered analysis, in fact applied a test more 
stringent than the reasonableness standard because the classification operated to the 
detriment of women-a traditionally disadvantaged, but not "suspect," class. This 
observation, however, does nothing to advance plaintiffs' cause in the age-restrictive 
zoning cases, since the challenged ordinances operate to benefit, rather than penalize, 
the members of a traditionally disadvantaged group. 
32. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1919). 
33. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). 
34. 220 U.S. at 78. 
35. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 
(1972). 
36. Korematsu v, United States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944). 
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interest."37 Furthermore, under these circumstances, "the State 
must demonstrate that its [classifying legislation] has been struc-
tured with 'precision,' and is 'tailored' narrowly to serve legitimate 
objectives and that it has selected the 'less drastic means' for effectu-
ating its objectives."38 Subjected to this rigorous scrutiny, statutes 
that impinge upon suspect classes or fundamental rights rarely 
survive constitutional challenge. 
From the point of view of the young excludee, the age-restrictive 
zoning classifies persons on the basis of age and then denies to 
young-agers the opportunity to reside in the retirement district set 
aside for older persons. Under the two-tiered equal protection 
analysis, then, the threshold issue is whether the age-based classifica-
tion "operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges 
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the 
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny."39 
In 1976 the Supreme Court decided that old age is not a suspect 
classification meriting strict scrutiny. In Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement v. Murgia,40 the Court upheld, against a challenge on 
equal protection grounds, a Massachusetts statute imposing manda-
tory retirement on uniformed state police officers at age fifty. The 
Court held that police officers over fifty were not a suspect class and 
accordingly applied the rational basis standard.41 The Court distin-
guished old age from "suspect" categories like race and nationality 
as follows: 
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been 
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who 
have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national 
origin, have not experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of 
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. 42 
37. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 018, 638 (1968) (emphasis original). 
38. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 
(1972). 
39. 411 U.S. at 17. 
40. 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
41. 427 U.S. at 312-13. The Court then validated the statute as not "wholly un-
related" to the legitimate state purpose of protecting the public by assuring the 
physical preparedness of the uniformed police. 427 U.S. at 316. 
42. 427 U.S. at 313. In this dissent, Justice Marshall called for a measure of 
judicial scrutiny somewhere between strict scrutiny and the loose rational basis stand-
ard: 
Of course, the Court is quite right in suggesting that distinctions exist be-
tween the elderly and traditional suspect classes such as Negroes, and between 
the elderly and "quasi-suspect" classes such as women or illegitimates. . . . The 
advantage of a flexible equal protection standard, however, is that it can readily 
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Noting that the classification at issue discriminated against middle-
aged as well as elderly persons and that most members of the 
political majority will eventually become elderly, the Court added 
that "even old age does not define a 'discrete and insular' group . . . 
in need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.' "43 
Given the Court's conclusion that the elderly are not a suspect 
class worthy of special protection, a fortiori, young-agers do not con-
stitute such a class. Obviously, young-agers-under the terms of the 
most typical ordinances, those under fifty-two or fifty-five years 
old-are not historically disadvantaged, are not socially isolated, are 
not without political power, and in most places are not a minority. 
Thus, age-restrictive zoning cannot be said to disadvantage a class 
of persons in need of special protection. To the contrary, it operates 
to benefit a minority, the traditionally less powerful group of older 
persons. For these reasons, a legislative classification that excludes 
young-agers from a designated residential district cannot be said to 
warrant strict judicial scrutiny on the ground that it works to the dis-
advantage of a suspect class. 44 
accommodate such variables. The elderly are undoubtedly discriminated against, 
and when legislation denies them an important benefit-employment-I con-
clude that to sustain the legislation appellants must show a reasonably sub-
stantial interest and a scheme reasonably closely tailored to achieving that inter-
est. 
427 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
43. 427 U.S. at 313 (quoting United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152 n.4 (1938) ). In effect, this analysis is based in part on the determination of 
whether age is a mutable or an immutable characteristic. In one sense, of course, 
age is mutable, since everyone who enjoys a normal lifespan will experience old age. 
But in other ways age is immutable. No one can, at any given moment, change his 
age. And no one who is old can become young again. In upholding legislative clas-
sifications based on age, courts have chosen to overlook the immutable aspects of 
aging in favor of the view that age is not an obstinate and unalterable characteristic 
like race. In Maldini, the New York Court of Appeals was faced with a zoning age 
restriction that allegedly discriminated against young people. Applying its view that 
age is not a fixed characteristic, the court concluded that the ordinance actually had 
no discriminatory effect: 
"Senior citizenship" may oe more appropriately regarded as a stage in life 
within the normal expectancy of most people than as an unalterable or obstinate 
classification like race . • . religion or economic status. Therefore, providing 
for land use suitable for the elderly may, as here, be viewed as a nondiscrimina-
tory exercise of the power to provide for the general welfare of all people • • • • 
36 N.Y.2d at 488, 330 N.E.2d at 408, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (citations omitted). 
Murgia involved the reverse situation-a statute that allegedly discriminated 
against older persons. Clearly the Maldini reasoning could not justify the Massachu-
setts statute under review in Murgia since it would be impossible for those excluded 
ever to enjoy the benefit accorded to the young by the act. But the Supreme Court's 
conclusion that older persons are adequately represented in the political process and 
do not warrant designation as a suspect class nevertheless indicates that the mutabil-
ity concept served as the basis for the holding. 
44. This reasoning was employed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Taxpayers 
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The next issue in determining the appropriate standard of 
judicial review is whether the legislation impinges upon a "funda-
mental" right. The Court has designated as "fundamental" those 
rights expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the various 
first amendment freedoms, 45 and other rights necessarily implied by 
constitutional provisions, such as the right to travel46 and the right 
to vote.47 
In its 1972 decision in Lindsey v. Normet;18 the Court held that 
access to housing is not a "fundamental" right, and thus it applied 
the rational basis test in rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality 
of Oregon's forcible entry and detainer statute. As the Court ex-
plained: 
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary 
housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies 
for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in 
-that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings 
of a particular quality . . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the 
assurance of adequate housing [is a] legislative, not judicial, 
[function]. 49 
In light of Lindsey, young excludees cannot assert, at least as a 
matter of federal constitutional law, that by denying them access to 
housing in a particular district the local government has abridged a 
"fundamental" right. 150 
Unlike access to housing, the right to travel, although nowhere 
expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, has been declared by the 
Assn. v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 281 n.15, 364 A.2d 1016, 1034 n.15 
(1976). 
45. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
46. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968). 
47. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
48. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
49. 405 U.S. at 74. As Justice Marshall observed in his dissent in Murgia, the 
Court "has apparently lost interest in recognizing further 'fundamental' rights and 
'suspect' classes." 427 U.S. at 318-19. But cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (declaring the choice of family living arrangements to be a 
fundamental right). 
50. Although the issue is thus apparently resolved as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, the result could be different if decided by a state court according to state 
constitutional principles. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Town-
ship of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1976). Justice Hall, in his widely 
noted opinion, stated that access to shelter is literally essential to a decent life and 
implied that housing will be treated as a "fundamental" right under state constitu-
tional law. 67 N.J. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725. See also the differing approaches of 
federal and state courts to the issue of the constitutionality of public school financing 
in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972); Serrano 
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 597, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1977); and Robinson 
v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273 (1973). 
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Court to be a "fundamental" right. As developed in the case law, 
the right seemingly came to include not only movement from state 
to state but also the right to take up residence at the point of 
destination. 51 The clearest assertion of that dimension of the con-
stitutionally protected right to travel came in the celebrated Peta-
luma case. 52 There the federal district court found that local land 
use regulations, aimed at controlling the rate and sequence of popu-
lation growth in the city, infringed upon the freedom to travel of 
prospective residents thereby excluded. The court consequently re-
quired the city to show that its annual numerical limit on building 
permits and its greenbelt "urban expansion line" were justified by 
a compelling state interest. Since the court found that the reasons 
advanced by the city were not persuasive, much less compelling, 53 
the "Petaluma Plan" was struck down. 
Were the district court decision in Petaluma the last word on the 
nature and scope of the "fundamental" right to travel, young ex-
cludees could assert a persuasive claim that age-restrictive zoning or-
dinances by virtue of their exclusiveness impinge upon the right to 
travel and should therefore be subjected to strict scrutiny. The district 
court's ruling in Petaluma, however, was reversed on other grounds 
by the Ninth Circuit, 54 and its strength as a precedent is consequently 
diminished. With respect to the right to travel issue, the Ninth 
Circuit did not deal with the merits directly. Rather, it held that 
the plaintiffs-landowners and builders in the city-lacked standing 
to assert the claim on behalf of prospective residents and those ex-
cluded. 55 However, dictum in the opinion strongly suggests that the 
Petaluma scheme did not violate the right to travel: "Although due 
to appellees' lack of standing we do not reach today the right to 
travel issue, we ~ate that the Petaluma Plan is not aimed at transients, 
51. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (collecting cases). '11te Court 
has refused to consider whether a constitutional distinction exists between interstate 
and intrastate travel. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-
56 (1973). 
52. Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 
1974), revd. on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 
934 (1976). · 
53. The city claimed that its water supply and sewage treatment facilities could 
not accommodate a higher growth rate and, in addition, that its actions were justified 
by a desire to protect its small-town character. The district court ruled that the 
water supply, which had been artifically limited, and sewer system could be made 
available to meet growth needs, 375 F. Supp. at 577, and that a desire to preserve 
the town's character could not justify growth controls, 375 F. Supp. at 583. 
54. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). 
55. 522 F.2d at 904. 
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nor does it penalize those who have recently exercised their right 
to travel . . . . "56 
The assertion that age-restrictive zoning impermissibly infringes 
upon the excludees' right to travel is also undercut by the Supreme 
Court's treatment of a related challenge in Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas. 57 The Belle Terre ordinance prohibited residency by more 
than two unrelated persons in any one housekeeping unit. Plaintiffs, 
a property owner and several unrelated tenants, 68 challenged the or-
dinance on equal protection grounds, asserting inter alia that the or-
dinance impinged upon their fundamental right to travel and that 
the 'compelling state interest standard should accordingly apply. Im-
plicit in the argument was the premise that the fundamental right 
to travel included the right to travel intrastate and to settle in resi-
dence at the point of destination. The plaintiff's claim, however, 
was summarily rejected by the Court. 59 Justice Douglas' majority 
opinion noted only that the ordin~ce "is not aimed at transients,"00 
a statement echoed by the Ninth Circuit in Petaluma. Since earlier 
cases that had indicated that the right to travel included not only the 
right to move from place to place but also the right to take up resi-
dence were not overruled or even distinguished, the Court's treat-
ment of ,thet i$ue is not particularly satisfying. Nevertheless, it 
seems that after Belle Terre excludees will find it difficult to claim 
that a zoning restriction impinges on a constitutionally protected right 
to travel. 61 
Finally, it is possible that the young-excludee plaintiffs can evoke 
strict scrutiny by ~sserting that age-restrictive zoning infringes upon 
a fundamental right of association. Essentially the same argument 
was advanced by the unrelated tenants in Belle Terre and was, like 
the right to travel claim, summarily rejected by the Court: "[The 
56. 522 F.2d at 906 n.13. 
57. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
58. Named tenant plaintiffs had left the house before the case reached the Su-
preme Court, causing Justice Brennan to dissent on the ground that no case or con• 
troversy existed after their departure. 416 U.S. at 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The 
majority, however, held that the plaintiff landlord's assertion that the rental value of 
the property was affected by the ordinance was sufficient to state a justiciable claim, 
416 U.S. at 9. 
59. Belle Terre was decided before Petaluma, but was dismissed as "not relevant" 
by the Petaluma trial court in a footnote. The court apparently sought to distinguish 
Belle Terre by asserting that the right to travel was not involved in that case. 375 
F. Supp: at 584 n.1. 
60. 416 U.S. at 7. 
61. Surely the fact that the young excludees may often seek to live in family 
groups while those excluded in Belle Terre were unmarried should not affect the 
travel issue. 
November 1977] Retirement Communities 79 
ordinance] involves no "fundamental" right guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, such as ... the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama 
... or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold v. Connecticut ... ; 
Eisenstadt v. Baird .... "62 The cases cited by Justice Douglas sug-
gest that the "fundamental" rights of association and privacy are 
limited to political and family affiliations and decisions involving pro-
creation. Clearly the young excludees, like the unrelated tenants 
in Belle Terre, are not seeking to establish or participate in political 
associations. Nor can they assert any rights concerning privacy and 
association in the family. All members of the class of young-
excludee plaintiffs-whether single people, couples, or families-
are by definition below the minimum age for residency. Whatever 
their family arrangements, they would still be barred by the 
ordinance because of their age. Like the unsuccessful Belle Terre 
plaintiffs, the young excludees are asserting an associational right of 
a social rather than political nature that is unrelated to matters of 
procreation or the family and therefore is unlikely to invoke strict 
·scrutiny. 
Since the young-excludee plaintiffs can neither establish them-
selves as a suspect class nor demonstrate that any fundamental right 
is impaired by an age-restrictive zoning ordinance, a court would 
be required to apply the rational basis standard of equal protec-
tion analysis to determine the measure's constitutionality as it" is 
applied to them. This standard of reasonableness focuses on the 
relationship between the government's chosen ends and means, ask-
ing first whether the locality's objective in creating the legislative 
classification is legitimate and, secondly, whether the classification 
is drawn in order to further that objective. Underlying that judicial 
evaluation is a theoretical presumption of legislative validity. Both 
the New York Court of Appeals in Maldini v. Ambro68 and the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in the W eymouth64 and Shepard6"5 cases sus-
tained age-restrictive zoning ordinances upon application of the 
rational basis standard. 66 An examination of these cases strongly 
62. 416 U.S. at 7-8 (citations omitted). Justice Marshall dissented in Belle Terre 
on this point. In his view, the right to select one's living companions is a "personal 
lifestyle choice" included in the rights of association and privacy guaranteed by the 
first and fourteenth amendments. 416 U.S. at 15-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
63. 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed, 423 
U.S. 993 (1975). 
64. Taxpayers Assn. v. Weymouth Township, 71 NJ. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976). 
65. Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A. 
2d 1005 (1976). 
66. The courts' decisions were couched in terms of statutory, due process, and 
80 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:64 
suggests that other plaintiffs who challenge such zoning will fail un-
less they are somehow able to invoke a more stringent standard of 
judicial scrutiny. 67 
Maldini arose in the Town of Huntington in Suffolk County, New 
York. With no provision for multiple dwellings within its borders, 
the town adopted an amendment to its zoning ordinance creating a 
"Retirement Community District" classification. The amendment 
allowed subsidized housing for the elderly, which was defined as fol-
lows: "Multiple residence designed to provide living and dining ac-
commodations, including social, health care, or other supportive ser-
vices and facilities for aged persons to be owned and operated by 
a non-profit corporation organized for such purposes under the laws 
of the State -0f New York."88 Having created the new zone, the 
Huntington Town Board approved •the application of a qualifjed 
sponsor for reclassification of its twenty-acre parcel to permit con-
struction of the type of facility described in the ordinance. Home-
owners living near the site -then sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief to bar the proposed development. 
In Weymouth, the taxpayer plaintiffs challenged two ordinances. 
The first, though on its face a regulation of mobile-home parks, in 
fact operated as a zoning ordinance. It prohibited mobile-home 
parks unless they were located upon tracts of at least 140 acres and 
were recommended by the township planning board and approved 
by the town's legislative body. Only three such parks were to be 
licensed to operate at any one time. The second ordinance rezoned 
a defendant's property as a "Trailer and Mobile Home District." 
The plaintiffs, challenge focused on the residency restrictions con-
tained in the first ordinance. One restriction required that at least 
eighty per cent of the mobile homes in any park contain no more 
than two bedrooms, clearly imposing a restriction, albeit indirect, on 
occupancy by families with children. A second was more specific, 
Hmiting occupancy to "elderly persons" or "elderly families," defined 
equal protection questions. However, the analysis of each issue finally turned upon 
the same questions: did the government's objective serve the general welfare so as 
to bring it within the legitimate scope of the police power, and was the legislation 
sufficiently related to the objective? 
67. Although the court in Weymouth held that "neither 'fundamental' rights nor 
'suspect' criteria for classification [were] implicated," 71 N.J. at 283, 364 A.2d at 
1034, so that strict scrutiny was not required, it recognized that the "right to decent 
housing" had preferred status under the New Jersey constitution requiring a "close 
judicial scrutiny" when governmental action threatened to impinge upon it. 71 N.J. 
at 287, 364 A.2d at 1037. Nevertheless, the court was "persuaded that the ordinances 
in question . • . satisfy the requirements of equal protection even when subjected to 
such scrutiny." 71 N.J. at 287, 364 A.2d at 1037. 
68, 36 N.Y.2d at 483-84, 330 N.E.2d at 405, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 388, 
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to be persons aged fifty-two or older and families "the head of which, 
or his spouse is 52 years of age or over."69 The obvious effect of 
the ordinance was to make mobile-home living in Weymouth avail-
able only to older people. 
In contrast, the Woodland Township ordinance at issue in 
Shepard contemplated high amenity "senior citizen communities," 
authorized as a special use in a iow-density residential-agricultural 
district. Permitted uses in these. developments included single-
fa!1lily detached and one-story attached dwellings, limited commer-
cial facilities, and shopping centers. The ordinance required devel-
opers to provide a clubhouse and recreational building, shuffleboard 
court, and swimming pool for residents and their guests. Detailed 
design and green-space specifications were imposed. The age re-
strictions contained in the ordinance were as follows: 
The permanent residents of a Senior Citizen Community shall be 
confined to persons who are 52 years of age or over except that 
one child who is 19 years of age or over may be permitted to 
reside in any senior citizen dwelling unit occupied by his or her 
parent(s) or guardian(s). Full time occupancy of any residential 
unit shall be limited to 3 individuals. 70 
As in Weymouth, plaintiff was a resident taxpayer of the town, not 
an excludee. 
In all three of the cases, the defendants asserted that the primary 
purpose of the age limitations was to remedy an existing shortage 
of housing for the elderly, a goal warmly endorsed by both the New 
York and New Jersey courts.71 In Weymouth, the defendant also 
admitted to a fiscal motive-its officials testified at trial that they 
had adopted the ordinance in part to obtain additional revenue for 
the town and to avoid additional burdens on overcrowded schools. 72 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, was able to avoid the 
fiscal zoning issue in Weymouth, 73 and, like the New York Court 
69. 7'1 N.J. at 259, 364 A.2d at 1021. 
70. 71 N.J. at 234, 364 A.2d at 1008. Neither the New Jersey Supreme Court 
nor the courts below addressed the issue of how the restriction on number of resi-
dents promoted the welfare of elderly housing consumers. 
71. In Maldini, the court of appeals described the provision of housing to the 
aged as "a matter of general public concern not only to the localfty but to the State 
and Nation as well." 36 N.Y.2d at 485, 330 N.E.2d at 406, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 389. 
See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 239-43, 
364 A.2d ·1005, 1010-13 (1976); Taxpayers Assn. v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J .. 
249, 266-74, 364 A.2d 1016, 1025-30 (1976). The appellate division in Campbell 
refers to the goal as "this laudatory purpose." 58 App. Div. 2d at 572, 394 N.Y.S. 
2d at 913. . 
72. 71 NJ. at 290, 364 A.2d at 1038-39. 
73. The .Weymouth court noted its previous invalidation of ordipances restricting 
new housing to categories of people who are net revenue producers or excluding 
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of Appeals in Maldini, upheld the restriction as a reasonable means 
of serving the housing needs of the elderly.74 
In upholding the legitimacy of each community's declared objec-
tive, each court was forced to address the question whether the 
general welfare is served by legislation that responds to the needs 
of one group within the population to the exclusion of other sig-
nificant elements. 75 The Maldini court supported its conclusion by 
families with children in order to reduce school expenditures, 71 N.J. at 289, 364 
A.2d at 1038, but the court declined to apply the exclusionary test here on the ground 
that plaintiffs had failed to challenge the township's "overall pattern of land use regu-
lation." 71 N.J. at 294, 364 A.2d at 1040. The opinion admonished, however, that 
"[t]he Court's failure to probe more deeply into the possible exclusionary effect of 
similar ordinances should not be understood to be the product of blindness to their 
potentially exclusionary character, but only the consequence of plaintiffs' decision not 
to try the case on that legal theory." 71 N.J. at 295-96, 364 A.2d at 1041. The 
Maldini court, citing the town's ''unimpeachable good faith," found no exclusionary 
or fiscal motive in the enactment of that ordinance. 36 N.Y.2d at 487, 330 N.E.2d 
at 407, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 391. The implication is that the age restrictions would have 
been invalid if justified solely on fiscal grounds. 
7-4. 71 N.J. at 288, 364 A.2d at 1037. Several years after adoption of the Wey-
mouth and Woodland Township ordinances, New Jersey revised its zoning enabling 
legislation in an attempt to encourage and provide guidelines for senior citizen zoning 
that would not run afoul of exclusionary zoning charges. Municipal Land Use Law, 
1975 N.J. Laws, ch. 291 (codified at NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-1 to :55D-92 (West 
Supp. 1977)). Section 65(g) allows the local government to zone for such develop-
ment only if the zoning is "consistent with provisions permitting other residential uses 
of a similar density in the same zoning district." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-
2(1) (West Supp. 1977). The New Jersey Supreme Court in Weymouth expressed 
its disapproval of this provision, finding it inadequate protection against the exclu-
sionary threat of senior citizen housing and worrying that the "similar density" guide• 
lines might impede rather than encourage the development of such housing. 71 N .J. 
at 292-93, 364 A.2d at 1039-40. Instead, the court endorsed the proposal of the New 
Jersey Public Advocate that "zoning for planned housing developments for the elderly 
be permitted only as part of a comprehensive municipal plan for a balanced housing 
stock." 71 N.J. at 293, 364 A.2d at 1040. 
75. On a larger scale, the preliminary inquiry might be into the effect of age• 
restricted living on society as a whole. There are few answers to be found in the 
social science literature on this question, although much of the scholarly work on 
the subject of residential age segregation endorses the social utility of the concept. 
It is fair to say that the current majority view among gerontologists and sociologist~ 
deems the exclusion of younger age groups from retirement communities to be so• 
cially acceptable. See, e.g., I. Rosow, Soc:IAL INTEGRATION OF THE AGED (1967); 
Bultena & Wood, The American Retirement Community: Bane or Blessing?, 24 J. 
GERONTOLOGY 209 (1969); Rose, The Subculture of the Aging: A Topic for Socio-
logical Research, 2 THE GERONTOLOGIST 123 (1962). But see D. JONAS & D. JoNAS, 
YOUNG nLL WE Drn (1973), in which it is concluded that the planned retirement 
communities, with their lack of intergenerational contacts and overwhelming emphasis 
on leisure, tum many older people into "dependent, protected, or playful 'superchil-
dren', [with] the retirement communities .•. becoming what might be called the 
nurseries of second childhood." Id. at 154-55. 
Unfortunately, the experts' endorsement of age segregation is often made only in-
directly or implicitly, in connection with the study of a particular retirement com-
munity or some single aspect of life therein. Those few studies that have addressed 
the relationship of age-homogeneous living to society often take the form of dis-
proving certain negative hypotheses about the impact of a retirement development on 
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characterizing age as "a stage in life."76 Since the general populace 
theoretically will aehieve old age, the provision of housing for senior 
citizens can be said to serve the welfare of the vast majority who 
will be old.77 The New Jersey court in Weymouth took a somewhat 
the local community that houses it. See, e.g., K. HEINTZ, supra note 1, at 65-144, 
in which the author seeks to disprove the hypothesis that retirement developments 
have an adverse fiscal and political impact on their host communities. 
Left unaddressed are the more profound questions raised by residential age segre-
gation, such as what it portends for the future relationship of the generations. Wide-
spread age districting raises the possibility that large numbers of children will grow 
to adulthood without the opportunity for daily contact with older people. Adverse 
consequences of this kind of isolation include the polarization of the generations-
older people would develop a group identity by casting out youth and refusing further 
involvement with the general culture, and younger people, denied the ability to pre• 
pare for their own aging by witnessing the process in others, would face growing 
old with bewil~erment and even fear. Finally, a strong argument can be made that, 
in a pluralistic society, segregation-particularly the exclusion or inclusion of people 
based on their physical characteristics-should not be encouraged. Although it is 
otherwise distinguishable from racial segregation, age districting does share the ele-
ment of categorizing as undesirable those persons who share only a physical charac-
teristic. To this .extent, age segregation, like racial segregation, is offensive because 
it ignores the individuality of those classified as desirable or undesirable. 
76. 36 N.Y.2d at 488, 330 N.E.2d at 408, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 392. 
77. Aside from providing adequate shelter for the aged that meets their particular 
economic and physical needs, senior citizen housing can also be said to serve the 
"special social and psychological needs of the elderly." Taxpayers Assn. v. Wey-
mouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 269, 364 A.2d 1016, 1027 (1976). Hard as it may 
be for the uninitiated to imagine, sociologists have developed a means of measuring 
morale or happiness in human beings, called the "life satisfaction scale." See Neu-
garten, Havighurst & Tobin, The Measurement of Life Satisfaction, 115 J. GERON-
TOLOGY 134 (1961). A comparative survey of the life satisfaction levels of retired 
persons in regular and age-segregated communities in Arizona found 75% of the re-
tirement community residents surveyed to be satisfied with retirement life, compared 
with only 57 % of those who resided in normal communities. The median level of 
satisfaction in the retirement community population ranked in the "high" category, 
whereas median satisfaction of retirees in outside communities was classified as 
"medium." Bultena & Wood, supra note 75, at 211. But see I. JACOBS, FuN CITY 
(1974), a study of one large retirement community that found many of the residents 
to be lonely and unable to deal with their isolation. The study concluded that, "while 
most residents felt that they had achieved the peace and quiet they had sought, it 
was at a price [i.e., being cut off from society as a whole] that was higher than some 
had intended to pay." Id. at 82. 
Scholarly studies and less formal surveys of retirement community dwellers pre-
dictably expound a widely shared view that the absence of children and younger 
adults is an important positive aspect of the age-homogenous environment. Besides 
ensuring some measure of quiet and order, see H. WHITMAN, A BRIGHTER LATER 
LIFB 169 (1971), age segregation has been claimed to reduce stress by insulating resi-
dents from the loss of status generally suffered by retired persons in American so-
ciety. 
They [the residents] felt a great community bond in the fact that all of them 
were on an equal plane, as it were. They were not in competition with younger 
people, nor were they relegated to the back seat automatically reserved for the 
aged. They were the active movers and doers of the community, not the 'has-
beens' • • . • Moreover they were not oppressed • • . by the fad of youth wor-
ship: 
Id. at 1158-59. See Rose, supra note 75, at 123. 
In addition, the "social opportunity" available to retirement community residents 
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different approach to the issue. Rather than suggesting that age-
restrictive zoning ordinances serve the general welfare78 because the 
is frequently cited by them and others as another important source of satisfaction. 
Sociologists have tested and confirmed the seemingly paradoxical hypothesis that the 
more age segregated an area, the more socially integrated are its residents-that is, 
the more formal and informal social contact between neighbors and more friendships 
among them. See I. Rosow, supra note 75. The particular affinity of the elderly 
for each other derives largely from shared experience. The "empty nest" syndrome-
the sense of loss experienced as the children leave home or for other reasons the 
family begins to diminish-makes more acute the desire and willingness for friendship 
and provides a common ground of understanding. Common physical limitations, 
or tl).e increased possibility of their onset, and a shared generational vantage point on 
a rapidly changing society also contribute to a sense of community among older 
persons. See Rose, supra note 75, at 123. 
This thesis does not consider the pre-retirement social lives of the populations sur-
veyed, however. It is possible that planned retirement communities are most attrac-
tive to those accustomed to an extensive social life. To the extent that the social 
integration of retirement community residents is related to their previous level of so• 
cial activity, age segregation loses some of its importance in explaining their involve-
ment with each other. 
It may be, however, that the high economic and social status of the residents of 
a high-priced retirement community favorably affects the level of contentment among 
the community's residents. Studies have indicated that the widely shared personal at-
tributes and felicitous circumstances of residents are just as important to their psy-
chological welfare as are the exclusion of children and young adults. Although no 
definitive nationwide statistics exist, studies of particular developments show that, 
except for the low-income elderly who reside in government-subsidized developments, 
residents of retirement communities are an elite socioeconomic group among retirees. 
A study of Arizona retirement community dwellers, for example, showed that 52% 
had formerly held professional or management positions and that 43 % had one or 
more years of college. They also appeared to enjoy better health than did retirees 
living in other settings: 75% of those polled in the retirement communities saw their 
health as good or very good, as compared with 59% of the retirees residing outside. 
Bultena & Wood, supra note 75, at 212. Similarly, a study of the residents of five 
representative retirement communities in New Jersey found that 43 % of the retire-
ment community dwellers had attended college, as compared with 11 % of the elderly 
nationwide; more than two-thirds of the communities' residents had been professional 
workers, which is twice the proportion of professionals in New Jersey's entire work 
force; and at least three-quarters of the surveyed population exceeded the national 
median income for persons aged 65 and over. In terms of racial makeup, these com-
munities were overwhelmingly white. See K. HEINTZ, supra note 1, at 32-38. The 
New Jersey study concluded that 
(a]lthough the retirement development group is not generally of the upper-
income class, it is, nonetheless, a select status group, when educational and oc-
cupational characteristics are examined in combination with income statistics. 
The New Jersey retirement community population is comparable in socio-
economic characteristics to the other national retirement community residents, 
but is obviously distinct from the elderly population at large on the basis of race, 
of household composition, and more importantly, of social status indicators such 
as education, occupation, and income. 
Id. at 37. 
To the extent that these characteristics would be shared by the residents of a pro-
posed age-restricted community, the question whether the general welfare is served 
· by a zoning ordinance directed at but one insular minority within the elderly minority 
of the population at large becomes more troublesome. 
78. In the New Jersey cases, the issue arose in the context of the question 
whether the towns' statutorily delegated power to zone to "promote • • • the general 
welfare" included the power to zone for senior citizen developments. Even though 
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bulk of the population will at some point be~ome eligible for the 
benefits afforded the elderly, the court argued that the general wel-
fare concept is "expansive" and "capacious," contemplating "the pro-
vision of housing for all categories of people, including the el-
derly."70 Moreover, the court found it particularly noteworthy that 
'the special housing and social needs of elderly persons-whose 
numbers are increasing rapidly both in absolute terms and as a per-
centage of the population-would be served especially well by age-
homogeneous retirement communities. so 
In order to uphold the ordinances challenged in Maldini, 
Weymouth, and Shepard, the rational basis standard requires a find-
ing that the age-based classifications are reasonably related to the ex-
pressed goal of providing appropriate housing for the aged. Of the 
three ordinances, the one at issue in Maldini seems most consistent 
with that goal. The retirement community anticipated by the 
Maldini ordinance was to be publicly subsidized, and units were to 
be available to consumers at low cost. Support services were to be 
provided for those with· limited ability to care for themselves. In 
addition, the ordinance set no precise age limit for exclusion, but 
rather referred to "residences designed ... for aged persons."81 
the issue was statutory, the considerations brought to bear were the same as those 
in due process and equal protection analysis. 
79. 71 N.J. at 275, 364 A.2d at 1030 (emphasis original). 
80. 71 N.J. at 266-75, 364 A.2d at 1025-30. 
The court also noted the federal government's actions in recognition of the fact 
that older people face special problems in locating suitable housing because of low 
fixed incomes, difficulties in obtaining mortgage financing, and the need for housing 
specially planned for safety and convenience. See Senior Citizens Housing Act of 
1962, 12 U.S.C. § 170lr (1970). 
Congress has enacted several measures to address these problems, the most im-
portant of which are authorization of direct loans for the development of rental hous-
ing for low income elderly persons, see 12 U.S.C. § 170lq(a)(2) (1970); and rent 
subsidies for tenants in such housing, see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(g) (Supp. V 1975). See 
generally Melm!Ul,. Housing for the Aged-the Government Response: An Analysis 
of the Missouri Boarding House for the Aged Law, 8 URB. LAW. 123, 125-30 (1976). 
It is important to note that Congress' purpose in creating these programs was not 
to establish age-segregated communities, but rather to increase the supply of housing 
available to low and moderate income elderly persons. But cf. Riley v. Stoves, 22 
Ariz. App. 223, 229, 526 P.2d 747, 753 (1974), where the Arizona Court of Appeals 
incorrectly states that "Congress has recognized the need of elderly Americans for 
adult communities." Contrary to the Arizona court's statement and the implication 
contained in the New Jersey cases, Congress has nowhere found or declared that fed-
eral funds should be spent to provide elderly persons with a child-free environment. 
Similarly, the expressed purpose of the New Jersey Senior Citizens Housing Act, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. 55:141-1 to -9 (West Supp. 1977), which was cited in Weymouth, is 
to facilitate development of federally funded housing projects for lower-income 
elderly persons, and not to establish age-homogeneous communities. See N.J. STAT. 
ANN. 55:141-2 (West Supp. 1977). 
81. 36 N.Y.2d at 483-84, 330 N.E.2d at 405, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 388. 
86 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:64 
Presumably the development's nonprofit sponsor could admit resi-
dents solely on the basis of their need for the facilities provided in 
the community, without regard to rigid age limitations. 82 
The ordinance in Weymouth, however, seems less suited to that 
town's avowed goal. Although there is no question that mobile 
homes, the subject of the township's ordinances, are well suited to 
the needs of the elderly consumer for moderate-cost housing of 
manageable size, it is less clear whether the residency limitation to 
persons aged fifty-two and over is reasonably related to the goal of 
meeting the particularized housing needs of the elderly. Certainly 
a great many persons over fifty-two do not possess physical and so-
ciological characteristics that suggest housing needs distinct from 
those in -the mainstream of the population. 83 Indeed, the court itself 
seemed implicitly to acknowledge that fact, for in asserting the need 
for housing designed specifically for the elderly, the court relied on 
data concerned exclusively with persons sixty-five and over. 84 How-
ever, by placing heavy reliance on the presumption of legislative 
validity, the court sustained the classification as not unreasonable. 86 
The New Jersey Court granted similar leeway to the ordinance 
challenged in Shepard, though that ordinance was perhaps even less 
adapted to the generally recognized housing needs of the elderly. 
Besides setting the minimum age for occupancy at fifty-two, a 
relatively young age, the disputed measure contemplated construction 
of high amenity and therefore relatively high-cost housing. Though 
such housing would be functionally well suited to the elderly, its high 
82. In Campbell v. Barraud, 58 App. Div. 2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977), 
the New York court upheld an ordinance ~that established the age for residential eligi-
bility at 55, with exceptions for underage spouses and caretakers and for children and 
grandchildren over the age of 19. It is unclear whether the planned development 
was to be low or moderately priced. 
83. In fact, the age limitation as formulated could operate counter-productively, 
in that it would permit middle-aged purchasers to compete with the elderly in secur-
ing access to a limited supply of suitable housing. 
84. See 71 N.J. at 266-69, 364 A.2d at 1025-27. To conclude, however, that the 
minimum age of 52 is too low in light of the purpose of the ordinance is ultimately 
to conclude that the ordinance,, in order to pass the test of reasonableness, must be 
more restrictive, not less. That is, age-restrictive zoning is most closely related to 
its purpose when it is most exclusionary. This observation again calls into question 
·whether residential age restrictions can be said to serve the general welfare. See 
notes 75-80 supra and accompanying text. 
85. 71 N.J. at 284-85, 364 A.2d at 1035. The court noted several justifications 
for concluding that the age 52 cutoff was not unreasonable or without factual basis, 
including a decline in net income for many persons reaching this age and the general 
lowering of the age of retirement in this country. A less persuasive reason also given 
was that the median age at which men and women become grandparents is now 57 
and 54, respectively. 71 N.J. at 284, 364 A.2d at 1035. 
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price does not respond to the needs of those most seriously affected 
by the housing shortage-elderly persons with low incomes and 
limited savings. The court, however, was able to find that the 
ordinance was sufficiently responsible to the needs of the elderly 
population in general, partly because it believed the ordinance 
would operate indirectly to provide the elderly with more low-cost 
housing opportunities. 86 In this connection, the court noted that the 
increased densities permitted by the ordinance would result in hous-
ing that was less expensive than dwellings with comparable ameni-
ties in other parts of the town.87 Additionally, the court predicted 
that a "filtration effect" would occur in the area housing market: 
[C]onstruction of senior citizen communities will indirectly in-
crease the supply of housing for all income groups as more elderly 
citizens gravitate towards retirement communities. For example, 
as middle and upper income persons leave their former homes for 
retirement communities, more housing will become available for 
elderly persons with lower incomes . . . . 88 
In sum, the court "was satisfied that the Woodland Township ordi-
nance serve[d] the peculiar housing needs of the elderly,"89 and, 
indeed, that it was "in many respects, even more responsive to the 
special housing needs of the elderly than the zoning ordinances which 
we upheld in Weymouth Tp." 90 
2. Due Process 
As with equal protection claims, a challenge on substantive due 
process grounds calls for a choice between individual rights and 
legislative assertions of the public interest. Due process claims most 
86. 71 N.J. at 242-43, 364 A.2d at 1012. 
87. 71 N.J. at 243, 364 A.2d at 1012. 
88. 71 N.J. at 243, 364 A.2d at 1012. The best that can be said for this asser• 
tion is that the cause and effect relationship posited is extremely indirect and could 
be achieved only over a long period of time. Moreover, it is interesting to note that 
Justice Pashman, author of the Shepard opinion, himself refuted the ''filtration effect" 
agrument in his earlier concurring opinion in Southern Burlington County NAACP 
v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 15•1, 205, 336 A.2d 713, 741, appeal dismissed, 
423 U.S. 803 (1975): 
In theory, low and moderate income families should benefit even from construc-
tion of new housing which they themselves cannot afford because such housing 
creates vacancies which "filter down." In reality, however, most of these 
vacancies are absorbed by the enormous lag between population growth and new 
housing construction. . . . The housing which does ''filter down" to persons 
with low or moderate incomes is o{ten badly dilapidated and in deteriorating 
neighborhoods. 
89. 71 NJ. at 243, 364 A.2d at 1012-13. 
90. n N.J. at 240, 364 A.2d at 1011. 
88 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:64 
often invoke the rational basis test of whether the measure is rea-
sonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The legisla-
tion is treated with deference and usually survives the limited judicial 
review. 91 However, as in equal protection analysis, if the challenged 
measure impinges on certain "fundamental" personal liberties, "the 
usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate,"92 and 
the court will accordingly apply more careful and searching review. 
To justify the legislation under this more rigid standard, the state 
must show that the enactment is closely related to the achievement 
of important governmental interests.93 This more rigorous scrutiny, 
of course, correspondingly diminishes the chances that the legislation 
will survive constitutional challenge. 
After Belle Terre,94 young excludees cannot claim infringement 
upon fundamental personal rights of travel, privacy, or association 
solely by virtue of their exclusion from a residential area. For 
essentially the same reasons that an equal protection claim would 
be unsuccessful, it is •unlikely that due process arguments would 
overturn age-restrictive zoning ordinances. Left to judge the state's 
ends and means by the standard of reasonableness, the courts are 
likely to sustain these ordinances under the due process clause, as 
the highest courts of New York and New Jersey already have, on 
the ground that these measures reasonably serve the state's legiti-
mate interest in providing for the housing needs of the elderly. 
·one group of young excludees, however, has a somewhat dif-
ferent claim to assert under substantive due process. Since age-
restrictive zoning ordinances are commonly phrased in terms of 
occupancy and not ownership, young persons, though barred from 
residence, remain free to own property in a restricted zone. Thus, 
the situation might arise where a young person acquires property 
in a retirement community, perhaps by gift or devise, but is barred 
by law from residing there. For these excludees, the ban on occu-
pancy denies user rights traditionally associated with property o~ner-
ship and thus arguably violates the fourteenth amendent's guaran-
91. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme 
Court for the first time upheld the constitutionality of zoning. In the course of its 
analysis of the due process issue, the Court stated: "If the validity of the legislative 
classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must 
be allowed to control." 272 U.S. at 388. 
92. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977). 
93. 431 U.S. at 499. 
94. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), discussed in text at notes 
51-62 supra. 
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tee against deprivation of property without due process of law. 
Though this claim has yet to be litigated and thus is difficult to 
assess with any degree of certainty, it can be argued that the ordi-
nance has deprived the young owner of all personal uses of his prop-
erty, which might be considered a "taking" in violation of the due 
process clause. 95 On the other hand, it is clear that the ordinance 
is not totally confiscatory, since the property can still be rented or 
sold to persons eligible for occupancy and thus retains at least most 
of its economic value. Furthermore, courts have sustained the 
constitutionality of public land restrictions that bar owners from 
occupying their own property.96 Finally, communities that enact 
age-restrictive zoning ordinances can cite the New York and New 
Jersey cases as support for the claim that such zoning serves a 
legitimate purpose of the general welfare that justifies the inter-
ference with a landowner's normal prerogatives.97 
C. Constitutional Claims of Older Excludees 
Age-restrictive zoning ordinances, regardless of their exact for-
mulation, uniformly prohibit residency by school-age children. The 
most exclusive ordinances bar occupancy by all persons under 
the specified minimum age, which of course excludes -young spouses 
as well as children. Other less exclusive measures allow spouses 
below the minimum age and one or more children above high-school 
95. "The general rule . . . is, that while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
For cases in which zoning restrictions were overturned on due process grounds, 
see Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Arvene Bay Constr. Co. 
v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). 
96. See, e.g., Lamb v. City of Monroe, 358 Mich. 136, 99 N.W.2d 566 (1959); 
Roney v. Board of Supervisors, 138 Cal. App. 2d 740, 292 P.2d 529 (1956) (uphold-
ing noncumulative zoning ordinances excluding residences from industrial districts). 
91. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (sus-
taining zoning ordinance against attack on due process grounds, the Court having 
found the legislative purpose to be sufficiently related to the public health, safety, 
and welfare). 
Older owners might advance a similar claim based on fourteenth amendment 
property rights. Although eligible to reside in the retirement community, their con-
trol over the alienation of their property is impaired by the zoning ordinance that 
establishes a minimum age for occupancy since conveyance to younger persons or, 
in some instances, to older excludees is effectively precluded when the conveyee is 
not free to reside on the property. This claim carries considerably less force than 
does the claim of the excluded owners, however. Unlike excludees who have ac-
quired property in the retirement community, the older owner is eligible to occupy 
his property. Moreover, property values are unlikely to be significantly affected, and 
may even be enhanced, by the indirect restraint on alienation so long as demand for 
retirement living remains high among middle-aged persons. 
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age (usually those aged nineteen or over). These ordinances thus 
operate to exclude older p~rsons as well as younger persons, in that 
residents or potential residents who meet the minimum age require-
ments may nonetheless be excluded if they live with school-age chil-
dren or, depending upon the ordinance, with a young spouse. 
The Supreme Court has designated as "fundamental to the very 
existence and survival of the race" the right of privacy and choice 
in regard to marital and family matters. 98 An important early ex-
plication of this "fundamental" right is found in Meyer v. Nebraska,00 
where the Court overturned a state statute that forbade the teaching 
of any language other than English to school children prior to the 
ninth grade. Thei decision was based in part upon the parents' 
right under the "liberty" clause of the fourteenth amendment to 
control the education of their children. In attempting to delineate 
this right, the Court stated: 
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness 
-the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much considera-
tion and some of the included things have been definitely stated. 
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint 
but also the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home 
and bring up children . . . .100 
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 101 the Court used 
a similar rationale to overturn a state statute that required all chil-
dren between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public school. 
Citing Meyer, the Court found that the act "unreasonably interferes 
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing 
and education of children under their control."102 In a later case, 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 103 the Court described Pierce and Meyer 
as decisions that "respected the private realm of family life which 
the state cannot enter."104 
The Supreme Court has also recognized a fundamental right to 
freedom from governmental interference in matters involving pro-
98. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316-U.S. 535,541 (1942). 
99. 262 U.S. 390 (1922). . 
100. 262 U.S. at 399. . 
101. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
102. 268 U.S. at 534-35. 
103. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
104. 321 U.S. at 166. In Prince the Court did permit the state to enter some 
aspects of family life, however, by upholding-the application of the state's child labor 
laws to religious leafletting by a nine-year-old Jehovah's Witness acting at the direc-
tion of her aunt and guardian. 
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creation. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,105 the first case in this area, the 
Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate on equal protection 
grounds a state statute authorizing sterilization of certain recidivist 
felons. Later, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 106 the Court invalidated 
on due process grounds a state statute forbidding the use of contra-
ceptive devices. Justice Douglas' opinion found the stafute violative 
of the right to privacy in marriage that, although nowhere specifically 
mentioned in the Constitution, lies "within the zone of privacy created 
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."107 Eisenstadt 
v. Baird108 further defined -the right of privacy and choice in matters 
of procreation by overturning a state statute that forbade the sale and 
advertisement of contraceptives to unmarried people. Similarly, in 
Roe v. Wade,109 the Court relied ·on "[t]his right of privacy, whether 
founded in ,the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or . . . in the 
Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people,"110 in striking 
down on due process grounds Texas' anti-abortion statute. Finally, 
in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,111 the right of family 
privacy was found to clash with a state statute mandating retirement 
of female workers in the fifth month of pregnancy. Overturning 
the measure on due process and equal protection grounds, the Court 
stated that it had "long recognized that freedom of personal choice 
105. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
106. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
107. 381 U.S. at 485. More particularly, Justice Douglas found that the right 
to privacy resides within the "penumbra" of specific Bill of Rights' guarantees ap-
plicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 
including the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments. 318 U.S. at 482-85. In a 
now-famous concurring opinion, J_ustice Goldberg advanced the view that the "lib-
erty" clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, which through the ninth 
amendment are not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight 
amendments, are the sources of the right to marital privacy. 381 U.S. at 493 (Gold-
berg, J., concurring). In describing the character of the right protected, Justice Gold-
berg declared that "[t]he entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that 
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy 
and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the funda-
mental rights specifically protected." 381 U:S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
Justice Harlan, also concurring in the Court's judgment, declared that "[t]he Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bot-
tom." In his view, the Connecticut statute infringed upon due process "because [it] 
violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" 381 U.S. at 500. 
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice White 
also based his concurrence in Griswold solely on the fourteenth amendment due proc-
ess clause. 381 U.S. at 502. 
108. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
110. 410 U.S. at 153. 
111. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
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in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."112 
Besides child-rearing and procreation, the Court has recognized 
that the right of family privacy and choice extends to the selection 
of a spouse. Loving v. Virginia, 113 in which the Court in part used 
due process to invalidate Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, con-
tains a clear statement of the right: 
These statutes also deprive the [plaintiffs] of liberty without 
due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men. 
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental 
to our very existence and survival.114 
In a recent case, the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy 
and choice in family matters extends beyond parent-child and hus-
band-wife relationships to encompass the "extended family" as well. 
Also, and perhaps more important for present purposes, the Court 
offered the first clear statement that certain zoning ordinances may 
by virtue of their exclusivity impinge on protected family rights 
and thus be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland115 concerned a housing ordinance limiting occupancy 
in the city to members of a single family. The ordinance's compli-
cated definition of "family" excluded the combination of relatives 
living in Mrs. Moore's home, which consisted of Mrs. Moore, one or 
two of her sons, and two grandsons who were related to each other 
as first cousins, not as brothers.116 Mrs. Moore was convicted of 
violating the ordinance. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice 
Powell, 117 reversed the conviction on the ground that the ordinance 
112. 414 U.S. at 639-40. But cf. 414 U.S. at 651, 652 (Powell, J., concurring) 
(noting that these freedoms are not absolute). 
113. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
114. 388 U.S. at 12 (citing Skinnerv. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ). 
115. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
116. 431 U.S. at 496. As Justice Stevens notes in his concurring opinion in 
Moore, much of the litigation concerning single-family ordinances has addressed the 
question whether unrelated persons can be barred from residency. 431 U.S. at 515-
19. The East Cleveland housing code was more restrictive than the usual single-
family ordinance, in that occupancy was limited to certain combinations of relatives, 
thus barring some related persons. 
117. The 5-4 decision inspired a total of six separate opinions: the majority opin-
ion of Justice Powell (joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall), concur-
ring opinions by Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall), 
and dissenting opinions by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart (joined by Justice 
Rehnquist), and Justice White. 
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worked a denial of "liberty" and thus violated the due process clause-
of the fourteenth amendment. 
Citing Meyer, Pierce, Griswold, and LaFleur, the Court pointed 
to the factor that distinguished the East Cleveland ordinance from 
the zoning ordinance upheld in Belle Terre: 
Sut one overriding factor sets this case apart from Belle Terre. 
The ordinance there affected only unrelated individuals. It expressly 
allowed all who were related by "blood, adoption, or marriage" to 
live together, and in sustaining the ordinance we were careful to 
note that it promoted "family needs" and "family values." ... 
East Cleveland, in contrast, has chosen to regulate the occupancy of 
its housing by slicing deeply into the family itself. . . . 
When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family, 
neither Belle Terre nor Euclid governs; the usual judicial deference 
to the legislature is inappropriate. 118 
Adopting Justice Harlan's view of the concept of "liberty" as a 
dynamic "rational continuum" based on history and tradition, 119 the 
majority extended the family privacy cases, which were mainly 
concerned with couples and their dependent children, to find consti-
tutionally protected rights for extended families as weU.120 Since 
the East Cleveland ordinance impinged on Mrs. Moore's "funda-
mental" right to live with other members of her family,1 21 the Court 
resolved to "examine carefully the importance of the governmental 
interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the 
challenged regulation. "122 
To justify its restrictive definition of "family," the City of East 
Cleveland claimed an interest in limiting the burdens on its school 
118. 431 U.S. ;it 498-99 (emphasis original). By "Euclid," the Court was refer-
ring to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), discussed in 
note 91 supra. 
119. 431 U.S. at 501-02 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
120. "Ours is by no means a tradition limit~d to respect for the bonds uniting 
the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and 
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots 
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition." 431 U.S. at 
504. 
121. Dissenting Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, objected both to the 
Court's recognition of this "new" constitutional right and, more generally, to the 
Court's failure to exercise proper restraint on this substantive due process issue. 431 
U.S. at 531-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice White, also dissenting, asserted that 
"the interest in residing with more than one set of grandchildren is [not] one that 
calls for any kind of heightened protection under the Due Process Clause." 431 U.S. 
at 549 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger's dissent was based upon Mrs. 
Moore's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 431 U.S. at 521 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
122. 431 U.S. at 499. 
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system and preventing overcrowding and traffic congestion. The 
Court, however, although acknowledging the legitimacy of those 
goals, concluded that the East Cleveland ordinance "serve[d] them 
marginally, at best."123 In this regard, the Court noted that the 
ordinance was both underinclusive-for example, a dozen school-
age children could live in a single-family dwelling with their parents 
or with their parent and grandparent without violating the ordinance 
-and overinclusive-for example, the ordinance would bar occu-
pancy by an adult brother and sister who neither owned a car nor 
imposed upon the school system. In sum, the Court found the 
ordinance to have only "a tenuous relation" to the goals espoused, 
and thus it did not withstand the Court's scrutiny under the due 
process clause. 124 
The long line of cases vindicating a "fundamental" right to pri-
vacy and personal choice in certain matters involving marriage and 
the family has relevance to the claims of older persons who are 
excluded from residential areas by age-restrictive zoning ordinances 
on the basis of their family living arrangements. First, all such 
zoning restrictions limit the freedom to decide whether to bear 
children, a right recognized in Skinner, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and 
Roe. Under any formulation, these ordinances penalize older per-
sons who decide to have and live with children either by denying 
such adults the eligibility to reside in the designated zone or by 
requiring them to move away from their homes should they be 
residing in the restricted community at the time a child is born. 
Second, the most restrictive formulation of age-restrictive zoning 
ordinances affects older persons in the choice of a spouse, a right 
defined and protected in Loving. Under these enactments an older 
person marrying a spouse below the minimum age for occupancy 
is for all practical purposes denied access to or forced to leave the 
community. Similarly, an older person might lose residential eligi-
bility by marrying a spouse with young dependent children, even 
though rthe spouse might qualify by age. Finally, the older per-
son's right to live with his children and grandchildren in an ex-
tended family group, which is recognized as "fundamental" in 
123. 431 U.S. at 500. 
124. 431 U.S. at 500. The Court's analysis and conclusions are reminiscent of 
those propounded by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), discussed in text at notes 57-62 supra. Justice 
Marshall found the Belle Terre ordinance to be similarly under- and over-inclusive 
and thus insufficiently related to its declared purposes of preventing congestion and 
overcrowding. 416 U.S. at 18-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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Moore, is also limited by age-restrictive zoning. That limitation 
has perhaps the most widespread impact, since older persons, like 
Mrs. Moore, often assume the care and custody of school-age grand-
children. Again, the penalty for unde_rtaking a family living arrange-
ment similar to that of Mrs. Moore is denial· of access to or expulsion 
from the retirement zone.125 
The question that Moore and the other family privacy cases leave 
unanswered is whether a community might be able to present suffi-
cient justification for the adoption of age-restrictive zoning provisions. 
Since the older-excludee plaintiffs can assert "fundamental" rights 
of family privacy, the courts will impose on the defendant com-
munity a substantial burden of justification. To withstand the plain-
tiff's challenge on due process or equal protection grounds, the 
community must demonstrate that "important" or "compelling" in-
terests are in fact served by the ordinance. As the ~ity of East 
CleV'eland_didJn.Jhe lY./.oQ,:!!_ c.ase, the community niight defend its 
adoption of the age-restrictive zoning as necessary to prevent over-
crowding in certain school districts and the resultant increased bur-
den on taxpayers. In Moore, the Supreme Court found that goal to 
be "legitimate," although the East Cleveland ordinance was held to 
be insufficiently related to the purpose.126 
In challenging those provisions in age-restrictive ordinances that 
prohibit older persons with young spouses, the excludees can make 
a forceful argument that the means employed are not adequately 
related to the ends desired. The exclusion of young spouses does 
nothing to diminish demand on the public schools. As for the 
provisions excluding children, the town can argue that at least in 
regard to the school district in which the retirement community is 
located, the exclusion relates directly to the goal of preventing 
financial burdens on the public schools. In this respect, the plain-
125. In Moore, to be sure, the entire City of East Cleveland was subjected to 
the family restriction, leaving Mrs. Moore and her grandchildren no housing alterna-
tive within the city. Assuming, instead, that only one residential district in town is 
designated as age-restricted, it might be argued that, since comparable housing alter-
natives exist within the town, those excluded or expelled have not suffered a legally 
cognizable harm. Cf. 431 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) (extending this argu-
ment to the availability of comparable housing within the entire metropolitan area). 
This suggested limitation of Moore is not persuasive. First, expulsion from one's 
home, even though comparable housing might be available locally, is a sanction suffi-
ciently serious to warrant legal recognition and constitutional protection. Second, a 
holding that prescribes only city- or county-wide age restrictions leads to the anomal-
ous result that a giant subdivision with a population of 30,000 might validly be de-
signated an age-restricted community, whereas a small town with a population of 
10,000 could not be so limited. 
126. 431 U.S. at 500. 
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tiffs' challenge would be sustained on slightly different grounds from 
Moore. First, the purpose of avoiding the imposition of additional 
financial burdens on taxpayers might be found to be beyond the 
police power. More likely, such a fiscal motive could be found 
to be not sufficiently "important" or "compelling" to outweigh the 
"fundamental" right of older-excludee plaintiffs to be free in matters 
of procreation and to make private decisions about family living 
arrangements. 
The town's other justification for the age-restrictive zoning pro-
vision would be the supposed purpose of increasing the available 
housing supply for the elderly. Age-restrictive measures, as they 
relate to the older excludees, serve this goal only very indirectly 
at best, since the exclusion of below-age spouses does nothing to 
increase housing opportunities for older people. In fact, the ban 
on young spouses is linked to the goal only to the extent that older 
residents marry fellow-agers because of the restrictions, a result 
that seems improbable. Neither does the exclusion of older persons 
who live with young children advance the stated purpose of increas-
ing the housing supply for elderly housing consumers. Perhaps the 
ban on children might make hou~ing more affordable by forestalling 
tax increases connected with school expansion. But again, ends and 
means are only tenuously linked.127 
127. Another justification that the defendant township might offer is that mini-
mum age restrictions are necessary to achieve the living environment most satisfying 
to the elderly. Minimum age restrictions effectively eliminate the noise, traffic, and 
commotion commonly associated with children and younger adults, disturbances 
which at least some elderly persons find greatly annoying. Similarly, it may be pain-
ful for the retired elderly person to be directly reminded of his own now-lost youth, 
or to accept that the younger and more vigorous must be permitted to lead in the 
community. Age-restrictive zoning clearly serves to insulate the elderly from these 
possibly unpleasant contacts. Given this line or argument, the asserted interest behind 
age-restrictive zoning becomes in some sense aesthetic. The state seeks not only to 
provide the elderly with housing, but also to see that they live in peace and tran-
quility. 
An essentially similar purpose, though directed toward an entire community 
rather than simply a development for the elderly, was acknowledged by the Court 
to be legitimate in Belle Terre. Those presumably affected by the statute were, like 
the actual plaintiffs in the case, students or other more or less transient young adults. 
The fact that the ordinance was designed to preserve Belle Terre's tranquil character 
by excluding those deemed most likely to disrupt it did not persuade the Court that 
the village had exceeded its authority. In affirming this aesthetic dimension to the 
village's zoning power, the Court stated: 
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted 
are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. . • • 
The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy 
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and 
the blessings of quite seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for 
people. 
416 U.S. at 9. 
If, as seems likely, the Court were to accept the legitimacy of the aesthetic inter-
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To summarize, older excludees denied residency under the age-
restrictive zoning ordinance as a result of the family arrangements 
they have formed can claim· that their fundamental rights of familial 
association and privacy have been infringed. This claim is strongly 
supported by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Moore. Since 
excludees have invoked a fundamental right, it is unlikely that the 
ordinance can be justified. Thus, as applied to older excludees, 
age-restrictive zoning ordinances appear to be unconstitutional. 
ill. VALIDITY OF AGE-RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
Residential age limitations are imposed in some retirement com-
munities through a scheme of private restrictive covenants or declara-
tions rather than by zoning legislation. These privately imposed 
restrictions raise the issue whether the fourteenth amendment can 
be employed to bar their enforcement, at least against older ex-
cludees.128 
The Civil Rights Caoes129 established the proposition that the 
constraints of the fourteenth amendment apply only to "state ac-
est served by age-restrictive zoning in light of Moore, the question would become 
whether it would also find it to be "compelling." Since it seems difficult to argue 
that there is not at least a very high correlation between youth and the types of activ-
ity that the elderly may find disturbing, a challenge to the validity of the ordinance 
would focus not so much on the sufficiency of the relationship between means and 
ends as on whether the ends are so compelling as to justify the ordinance's infringe-
ment on family privacy rights. 
Although the issue was not directly addressed in Moore, that case, when read in 
conjunction with Belle Terre, seems clearly to limit the state's power to zone in 
favor of certain intangible interests at the point where such zoning intrudes on family 
privacy. Of course, the East Cleveland ordinance was also deficient, as was empha-
sized in Justice Powell's plurality opinion, in that it drew illogical distinctions be-
tween various family groupings and seemed based on the assumption that the type 
of family rather than its size indicated its capacity for increasing traffic or otherwise 
disturbing the community. But, while this perhaps would offer the Court a basis for 
distinguishing the questions presented by the East Cleveland ordinance from the age-
restrictive zoning ordinance, the importance the Court attached to the family rights 
found violated in Moore argues strongly that the distinction would be deemed insub-
stantial. More directly, if the right of family members to live with one another as 
they please can be limited simply by findings that exercise of the choice impairs the 
serenity of their neighbors, then the right cannot fairly be termed fundamental. 
128. Only one reported case has dealt with the enforceability of age-restrictive 
covenants. In Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974), the young 
defendants purchased a mobile home in a subdivision and resided there with two chil-
dren despite a restrictive covenant containing a minimum age provision for occupancy. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals simply assumed the presence of state action in finding 
the deed restriction to be constitutionally valid. The court rejected both the claims 
that the provision was unenforceably vague and violated public policy and the 
equitable defenses of unclean hands and changed circumstances. The case is analY,zed 
in Note, Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants Against Children: An Equal 
Protection Analysis, 17 Aruz. L. REv. 717 (1975). 
129. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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tion,'' as opposed to purely "private" conduct. Though simple to 
state, the proposition has proved .troublesome and vagarious in its 
application, likely because it seeks to define such fundamental 
politica) constructs as the limit on federal interference with state 
conduct and even on governmental intervention into private conduct. 
Thus the definitions of what is "state" and what is "private" action 
have developed over the years in a pattern that is not entirely co-
herent or logical, and· is probably best explained by an examination 
of the underlying political considerations. Although a comprehen-
sive overview of the concept of state action is beyond the scope of 
this work, certain generalities will be hazarded about what does-
and does not-constitute "state action,'' so that an inquiry can be 
made into whether the fourteenth amendment's requirements of 
fairness and equality apply to age-restrictive covenants. 
One proposition that is now undisputed is that the fourteenth 
amendment does not apply only to actions initiated by the state. 
As the Supreme Court declared in one of its more recent pronounce-
ments on the question, "Our cases make clear that the impetus for 
the forbidden discrimination need not originate with the state if 
it is state action that enforces privately originated discrimination."130 
Out of this basic notion have come three more or less distinct 
theories that account for judicial findings of "state action" in cases 
involving the "non-obvious involvement of the state in private con-
duct."131 The first two theories focus on the state and its involve-
ment or relationship with the entity that made the challenged action. 
One is the "state contacts" theory: state action may be found where 
the private entity is dependent upon the state for its existence, is 
heavily regulated by the state, or exists in a symbiotic relationship 
with the state. 
An examination of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area 
indicates, however, that its view of the state contacts theory has 
become increasingly restrictive. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 132 the case from which the theory first developed, the 
Court found state action in a private restaurant's refusal to serve 
black patrons. The Court's decision focused upon the facts that 
the restaurant was located in a parking building owned by the 
Wilmington Parking Authority, a state agency, that the restaurant 
was the Authority's lessee, and that the Authority used rent paid 
130. _Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972). 
131. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
132. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
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by the restaurant to defray certain· expenses arising out of the opera-
tion of the building. In the next state contacts case, however, Moose 
Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis,133 the Court refused to expand the theory's 
application, as it found no state action where a private club operat-
ing under a state liquor license refused to serve a black guest solely 
because of his race. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,134 the 
most recent of the state contacts cases, construes the theory even 
more narrowly. In that decision, the Court held that no state 
action existed where a heavily regulated, state licensed, privately 
owned electric utility company that enjoyed state-created monopoly 
status and enforced tariff regulations promulgated by the company 
but authorized and approved by- the state terminated service to the 
petitioner allegedly without notice or hearing.135 
The other theory_ of state action that focuses on the state's 
relationship with the private entity developed from a line of Supreme 
Court decisions beginning with Marsh v. Alabama.136 According to 
this theory, if the private entity is performing what is traditionally 
considered to be a "public function"-i.e., one associated with gov-
ernment and sovereignty-the actions of that private entity are 
"state action" embraced by the restrictions and limitations of the 
fourteenth amendment. In the famous Marsh case, the Court held 
that a corporate property owner, the proprietor of an old-fashioned 
company town, was constrained by the provisions of the first and 
fourteenth amendments, since the privately owned town was "built 
and operated primarily to benefit the public and since [its] opera-
tion is essentially a public function."137 The Court's more recent 
development of this theory, which has occurred principally in a series 
of shopping center cases, again indicates a trend toward a restric-
tive definition of state action.138 The Court has now rejected the 
claim, based on Marsh, that large, modern, suburban shopping 
centers have replaced the traditional central business district and 
133. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
134. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
135. Justice Douglas dissented in Metropolitan Edison on the grounds that the 
. company's actions were "sufficiently intertwined with those of the State" and "suffi-
ciently buttressed by state law" to constitute state action. 419 U.S. at 362 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting). 
136. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
137. 326 U.S. at 506. 
138. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 
551 (1972); Food Employees ·Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 
(1968). See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1965). 
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thus perform an equivalent public function. In the most recent 
case in this line, Hudgens v. NLRB,139 the Court found no state 
action-and thus no violation of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments-in the decision by the proprietor of a large shopping center 
to prohibit peaceful labor picketing on the premises.140 
A third discernible theory of state action focuse_s not so much 
on the state's role and relationship with the private entity as upon 
the substance of the challenged private action itself. This theory, 
propounded in Shelley v. Kraemer,141 has seen very little development 
in the case law, perhaps because it carries implications of virtually 
limitless governmental intervention into what has traditionally been 
considered purely private, individual conduct. In particular, the 
Shelley doctrine says that judicial enforcement of a racially dis-
criminatory private agreement142 is constitutionally impermissible. 
Here the constitutional constraints are applied not because of the 
state's special relation to the acting entity or because the private 
action is essentially "governmental" in character, but for some other 
reason that has proved to be difficult to isolate and identify with 
any degree of precision.143 Whatever the exact rationale and scope 
of Shelley, the Supreme Court has never extended the case to render 
constitutionally unenforceable any private discrimination drawn on 
nonracial grounds.144 
139. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
140. In Hudgens, the Court expressly overruled its decision in Food Employees 
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), which had been exten-
sively but unconvincingly distinguished in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 
(1972). 424 U.S. at 517-20. The Court remanded Hudgens to the court of appeals 
with directions to remand the case to the National Labor Relations Board for con-
sideration under the National Labor Relations Act alone, without reference to the 
first amendment. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented on the 
grounds that the case should have been decided on statutory rather than constitutional 
grounds and that Logan Valley should not be overruled. 424 U.S. at 525 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
141. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
142. The prohibited judicial enforcement includes not only the injunctive relief 
barred in Kraemer but awards of money damages as well. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 
U.S. 249 (1953). 
143. For examples of various attempts to formulate a rationale, see Henkin, 
Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV, 473 (1962); 
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REV, 1083 (1960); Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959); 
Pollak, Racial Di~crimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
144. See, e.g., Black v. CUtter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956), in which the 
Supreme Court declined to overturn a decision of the Supreme Court of California 
construing a collective bargaining agreement to render Communist Party membership 
"just cause" for an employee's dismissal. The Court viewed the California decision 
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In order to assess the relation of the state action theories to the 
validity of privately imposed residential age restrictions, it might 
be useful to posit a hypothetical situation. Suppose that a real estate 
developer offers a large number of dwelling units for sale pursuant 
to a scheme of development that includes express restrictions on age. 
The restrictions may be imposed in the deeds to individual units 
or, in a condominium offering, in the declaration of condominium 
and the individual deeds. It is reasonable to assume that, pursuant 
to the local government's exercise of its state-delegated authority 
to regulate land subdivision or condominium development, the de-
veloper has been required to obtain authorization from several local 
governmental offices before proceeding with the development. The 
local government has likely demanded certain concessions from' the 
developer--for example, the dedication of land for streets, schools, 
or parks-as a condition of its approval of the project. The de-
veloper might also be subject to state "blue sky" legislation, which 
regulates the offering of the subdivided lots or condominium units 
for sale and makes state approval of the terms of the offering a 
precondition of sale. Consumer protection measures of this sort 
usually require the filing of a registration statement with the' state's 
real estate department that sets forth the elements of the develop-
ment scheme, including the plan to impose age limitations. In sum, 
the hypothetical developer is subjected to extensive governmental 
regulation and is in fact dependent upon governmental approval for 
the success of the project. 
Given the present state of the case law, it seems unlikely that 
a court would find state action under the state contacts theory in 
the developer's imposition of age restrictions on pccupancy. Of the 
state contacts cases, Burton provides the most support for such a 
finding since in that case the state agency knowingly allowed racial 
discrimination to be carried out by a private instrumentality when 
the agency could have easily prevented it as an administrative matter. 
The developer hypothetical is similar to Burton in that the state 
or local government could prevent the discrimination agaip.st young 
persons by denying permission to develop and sell the units unless 
the age restrictions were removed. Moreover, in both Burton and 
the hypothetical case the level of contacts between the state and the . 
solely as a matter of contract construction under local law and found no substantial 
federal question presented. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and 
Justice Black, dissented on the ground that the state court's action invoked the Shelley 
v. Kraemer principle. 351 U.S. at 302. 
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private entity is high, in the developer situation as a result of exten-
sive governmental regulation and in Burton because of the landlord-
tenant relationship existing between the parking authority and the 
restaurant. 
Chances are, however, that an argument based on the Burton 
precedent would not prevail in the hypothetical case, since there are 
important distinctions between the cases. In Moose Lodge, the Court 
distinguished Burton by noting that a relationship of mutual ad-
vantages between the government and the private entity might be 
required to find state action: 
Here there is nothing approaching the symbiotic relationship be-
tween lessor and lessee that was present in Burton, where the private 
lessee obtained the benefit of locating in a building owned by the 
state-created parking authority, and the parking authority was en-
abled to carry out its primary public purpose of f umishing parking 
space by advantageously leasing portions of the building constructed 
for that purpose to commercial lessees such as the owner of the 
Eagle Restaurant.145 
No such mutually beneficial relationship exists in the developer 
case, where, as in Moose Lodge, the state does not derive any direct 
benefit from the developer's activity.146 Also, Burton involved racial 
discrimination, a fact that might have led the Court to impose 
responsibility on the state. The Court might view nonracial limita-
tions of the type imposed by the developer with less hostility and 
suspicion. Moreover, the Court's later decisions in Moose Lodge 
and Metropoltian Edison have circumscribed the Burton precedent. 
Moose Lodge is relevant to the developer hypothetical because it 
holds that state licensing is by itself an insufficient contact for state 
action. In Metropolitan Edison, the Court refused to find state 
action in the face of extensive state involvement that included 
licensing, regulation, and even granting the private entity a monopoly 
for the provision to the public of an essential service. Thus, even 
though the state's regulatory contacts with the residential land de-
veloper are extensive-more extensive, perhaps, than in Moose 
Lodge-they still do not rise to the level found insufficient for state 
action in Metropolitan Edison. As a result, the state contacts theory 
145. 407 U.S. at 175. 
146. Though it is, of course, possible that the town in which an age-restricted 
development is located might gain increased tax revenues or other growth-related 
advantages, such benefits would appear to be incidental in comparison with the in-
come received from the leasing of state-owned lands to a private commercial enter-
prise. 
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will not support a finding of state action in the developer's imposition 
of age restrictions. 
The public function rationale affords little more basis for a 
finding ·of state action. In support of the imposition of constitutional 
constraints, a claim could be made under this theory that the adop-
tion of private use restrictions in connection with land development 
is the functional equivalent of zoning-the public regulation of land 
use-with the private developer standing in the shoes of_ the local 
government. Certainly private land use limitations greatly concern 
the public interest and have an important cumulative impact on 
the nature and quality of our cities and towns. Also, it appears 
that the larger the development, the more the privately created 
scheme of land use restrictions takes on the character of zoning 
legislation, which typically affects whole districts covering relatively 
large land areas. 
But under current case law these considerations are probably 
insufficient to bring the developer's actions under the same constitu-
tional constraints that restrict the local government. In the shopping 
center cases culminating with Hudgens, the Court effectively limited 
Marsh to its facts and sharply curtailed the public function theory 
as a basis for governmental regulation of action that is formally 
private. Hudgens clearly demonstrates both the Court's reluctance 
to expand the range of federal control and its concern for the right 
of an owner to exercise broad authority over the use of his private 
property.147 These conservative instincts would almost surely pre-
clude a finding of state action when a private land developer imposes 
an age restriction on residential use. Not only would that finding 
circumscribe the owner's control of his private property, but it 
would also create endless new opportunities for litigation. If the 
Court were to find that private land development was invested with 
a governmental charaoter, then all the private deed restrictions 
common to residential subdivision schemes might be subject to 
constitutional challenge. Size, height, and setback limitations, aes-
thetic requirements like sign control and architectural review, and 
amenity provisions like the obligation to maintain common areas 
might all be attacked as discriminatory or unreasonable under the 
fourteenth amendment. The cases indicate the Court's unwilling-
ness to extend constitutional limitations-and thus the scope of 
147. The Court quoted from the· Logan Valley dissent of Justice Black: ''The 
question is, Under what circumstances can private property be treated as though it 
were public?" 424 U.S. at 516 (quoting 391 U.S. at 332). 
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governmental intervention into private decisionmaking-to that 
degree. 
An argument based on Shelley v. Kraemer seems the least likely 
of the three to support a finding that the residential land developer's 
imposition of age restrictions constitutes state action. Simply put, 
the Shelley principle, with its potential for vast escalation of 
federal interference with private conduct, has never been extended 
beyond private discrimination based on race-the evil to which 
the fourteenth amendment was originally directed. Thus, it is un-
likely that any court would hold that judicial enforcement of a 
privately imposed minimum age limitation would expose that limita-
.tion to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment.148 
Finally, it is important to note that persons seeking to enforce 
private age restrictions are in a position to invoke constitutionally 
protected rights and liberties of their own. As one commentator has 
observed, ~nforcement of a discriminatory private agreement re-
quires the court to choose between competing claims of equality 
and liberty.149 Opposing the defendants' assertions of the right to 
equal treatment in obtaining a residence, the plaintiffs in these 
covenant actions will claim "the freedom to choose one's neighbors, 
to make contracts and have them enforced, to deal with whom one 
chooses ... to be whimsical, sentimental, irrational, capricious."1110 
148. A fuJ1her development should be noted in connection with state action and 
enforcement of residential age restrictions. At least one state--Arizona-has passed 
legislation to aid in the enforcement of privately created age limitations. The 
Arizona provision, an amendment to the state's residential landlord and tenant act, 
makes it illegal for a person to rent his property in circumstances that, were the 
transaction a sale, would constitute a violation of a covenant against the sale of the 
property to persons who have a child or children living with them. Aruz. REV, STAT. 
§§ 33-303(B), -1317(B) (Supp. 1976). Additionally, the measure prohibits a per-
son from renting to people with children, even in the absence of an age-restrictive 
covenant, in a subdivision "presently designed, advertised and used as an exclusive 
adult subdivision." Id. Violation of the statute is made punishable by fine and, 
for repeated offenses, by fine and imprisonment. No cause of action for violation 
of the provision is granted to private parties, and there are no recorded cases in which 
the state has prosecuted violators under the statute. 
A prosecution by the state under the statute would be state action, of course, and 
thus would present serious constitutional questions. The measure discriminates 
against persons not on the basis of age, but on account of family status-that is, 
whether they have children living with them determines their eligibility to rent. In 
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Moore and the other cases noted above in 
connection with the rights of older excludees, see notes 98-12S supra and accompany-
ing text, the class excluded by the Arizona statute could invoke the compelling state 
interest standard by claiming infringement upon fundamental privacy rights. Prop-
erty owners might also claim that the measure unreasonably interferes with their 
fourteenth amendment property rights by severely diminishing the class of persons 
to whom they can rent. But see note 97 supra. 
149. Henkin, supra note 143, at 488. 
150, Id. 
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Specifically, the plaintiffs' claim is that the court's refusal to enforce 
the private age limitation would be state action denying them rights 
of contract and association protected by the Constitution. 
How the court would resolve the conflict between liberty and 
equality in the area of private age limitations has already been 
addressed in the analysis of the application of the state action doc-
trine to these restrictions. To the extent that the courts have 
decided to favor the claim of equality over the freedom to discrim-
inate, they have found state action in what is formaJly private con-
duct and then applied the strictures of the equal protection clause 
to that conduct. Shelley v. Kraemer is a clear example of this 
result.151 Under present case law, however, it seems unlikely that 
a cour~ would find state action in the imposition of private age 
restrictions. That conclusion, coupled with the demonstrated willing.-
ness of courts in the zoning cases to endorse residential age limita-
tions as beneficial, suggests that the plaintiffs' invocation of liberty 
and property rights will lead to enforcement of private age-restrictive 
covenants.152 
. IV.· CONCLUSION 
The planned retirement community has emerged as a significant 
element in the national housing picture. Residential age restrictions 
are imposed in connection with the development of most retirement 
communities, either by zoning ordinance or private covenant. The 
restrictions uniformly exclude school-age children from residency. 
Many establish a minimum age for occupancy, typically fifty-two or 
fifty-five, sometimes with exceptions for a spouse, a domestic em-
ployee under the minimum age, or for children beyond high-school 
age. 
Several recent cases, including d~cisions from the New York 
Court of Appeals and the New Jersey Supreme Court, have sustained 
the validity of age-restrictive zoning ordinances against attack on 
statutory and constitutional grounds. Although brought by residents 
and taxpayers who own property near the area designated in the 
ordinance as a retirement district, the cases have turned on the 
personal rights of young persons excluded from occupancy. The 
cases show that age-restrictive zoning can withstand challenge by 
or on. behalf of young excludees on equal protection and due process 
151. Even absent state action, liberty and property claims will not guarantee a 
freedom to discriminate on the basis of race. See, e.g., Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 
326 U.S. 88 (1945). 
152. As with other restrictive covenants, enforcement of private age restrictio~ 
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grounds. Young-agers do not constitute a suspect class and cannot 
assert fundamental privacy, association, or travel rights sufficient 
to invoke the court's strict scrutiny and the suspension of the pre-
sumpt~on of legislative validity. As applied to young excludees, 
age-restrictive zoning provisions have been justified as measures 
designed to increase the supply of housing for the elderly, although 
some have appeared to be aimed instead at increasing the housing 
supply for relatively affluent middle-agers. 
Age-restrictive zoning ordinances, however, operate to exclude 
persons on the basis of their family status as well as because of their 
age. Thus, an older person will be barred when he lives with a 
school-age child or, depending upon the ordinance, with a young 
spouse. The rights of older excludees have not been asserted or de-
termined in any case. But on the basis of current Supreme Court case 
law, it appears that age-restrictive zoning ordinances are unconstitu-
tional when enforced against older excludees, since the measures in-
trude upon fundamental rights of privacy and association involving 
marriage and the family. As applied to older excludees, these restric-
tions at best serve only indirectly to achieve the goal of increasing 
the housing supply for the elderly, and thus they could not withstand 
challenge by these plaintiffs, especially if the compelling state interest 
standard were adopted. 
· As for privately imposed residential age limitations, the threshold 
validity question is whether constitutional strictures can be applied 
might be defeated by the assertion of certain nonconstitutional defenses, such as the 
traditional equitable defenses of unclean hands, !aches, acquiescence, and changed cir-
cumstances. See REsTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPER1Y §§ 560-62, 564 (1944); 
2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPER1Y §§ 9.38-.39 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 5 POWELL ON 
REAL PROPER1Y, §§ 683-84 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1974). Although the traditional view 
is that equitable defenses are available only when injunctive relief is sought and thus 
cannot be asserted in an action for damages, RESTATEMENT, supra §§ 561, comment 
d; 562, comment c; 563, comment b, others have taken the position that a defense 
sufficient in equity should also be sufficient at law to bar enforcement of the promise, 
5 POWELL, supra § 684. 
For example, in actions to enjoin the sale or rental of property in the retirement 
community to young persons, the defendant property owners might claim the com-
mon-law defense that minimum age restrictions on occupancy constitute an indirect 
but effective and unreasonable restraint on alienation. See RESTATEMENT, supra § 
406, comment c. This argument parallels the fourteenth amendment property rights 
claim of defendant property owners in age-restrictive zoning cases, see text at notes 
95-97 supra, and probably has as little chance of success so long as there is sufficient 
demand for retirement community living among eligible older persons. The zoning 
cases, though decided on constitutional grounds, demonstrate the courts' willingness 
to find a worthwhile purpose behind the imposition of residential age restrictions, a 
factor that is an important determinant of the reasonableness of the restraint, see RE-
STATEMENT, supra § 406, comment i. 
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to bar their enforcement, at least against older excludees. None of 
the theories of state action seems to support application of the 
fourteenth amendment to private age restrictions. Thus, unless 
facts are present giving rise to one of the traditional equitable de-
fenses, it appears that private age restrictions are legally enforceable. 
